Newcastle United’s 2024/25 accounts cover a “memorable” season, when the club won their first major trophy for 70 years after defeating Liverpool in the Carabao Cup final.

Less dramatically, but of more importance to their balance sheet, they qualified for the lucrative Champions League for the second time in three years after finishing fifth in the Premier League.

They also reached the fifth round of the FA Cup, where they lost to Brighton and Hove Albion.

Newcastle United Women finished fifth in their first season in the FA Women’s Championship, having only turned full-time professional in the summer of 2023.

Ownership

This was Newcastle’s third full set of accounts under the ownership of the consortium led by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) after Mike Ashley’s long reign came to an end.

In the period since that acquisition in October 2021, there has been much progress both on and off the pitch, as the club has benefited from significant investment from the new owners.

As a result, Newcastle have finished fourth, seventh and fifth in the last three seasons, which represents a marked improvement on the latter years of the Ashley era.

Amanda Staveley stepped down from the board in July 2024, which led to PIF increasing its stake to 85%, while Jamie Reuben’s RB Sports & Media Ltd now has 15%. PIF said that this development was “part of the long-term plan to develop the club and make it a consistently credible competitor in domestic and European competitions”.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Newcastle reported a £35m pre-tax profit, compared to an £11m loss the previous year, though this owed a great deal to a £133m gain on exceptional asset sales to other group companies, primarily their famous St James’ Park stadium. If these were excluded, the club would have posted a substantial £98m loss.

Revenue rose £15m (5%) from £320m to a club record £335m, though this was more than offset by a steep increase in operating expenses, which shot up £56m (14%) from £389m to £445m.

In addition, profit on player sales dropped £50m (72%) from £70m to £20m, though net interest payable fell £3m (28%) from £12m to £9m.

Despite the absence of UEFA TV money, Newcastle managed to grow their revenue, very largely due to growth in commercial, which increased bx £37m (42%) from £86m to £123m. In addition, match day rose £1.5m (3%) from £50.1m to £51.6m.

This compensated for the fall in broadcasting income, which was down £23m (12%) from £184m to £161m, as they played in the Champions League the previous season.

However, the cost base once again significantly grew, as the new owners continued to invest in the squad and club infrastructure, as Newcastle strived to challenge at the top of the table, as well as compensating for the many years of austerity under Ashley.

Wages rose £24m (11%) from £219m to £243m, while player amortisation slightly increased £3m (3%) from £97m to £100m. In addition, other expenses shot up £25m (38%) from £68m to £93m, while depreciation was up by two-thirds from £5m to £8m.

On paper, Newcastle had the highest pre-tax profit in the Premier League last season with £35m, ahead of Aston Villa £17m, but both clubs were significantly boosted by asset sales.

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Although Leeds United are far from certain of staying up in the Premier League, they have done better than most observers would have predicted, given that all six of the promoted clubs in the previous two seasons have gone straight back down.

Leeds had secured promotion in 2024/25 in some style after winning the Championship with exactly 100 points under Daniel Farke, having scored an impressive 95 goals.

League Position

They had come close the previous season, when they finished third in the league, but they were then defeated 1-0 by Southampton in the play-offs.

Getting across the line means that Leeds have graced the stage in England’s top flight in four out of the last six seasons, including a praiseworthy ninth place finish in 2020/21.

This followed a decade in England’s second tier following the promotion from League One in 2009/10.

Leeds United are the only club in the United Kingdom’s third biggest metropolitan area, enjoying a strong fan base, so it probably should be in the top flight, especially given that it can leverage this “structural competitive advantage”.

Let’s take a look at these financial strengths, as well as some weaknesses, based on an analysis of the recently published 2024/25 accounts.

Ownership

These accounts cover the second season under the ownership of 49ers Enterprises, who assumed full control of the club at the end of the 2022/23 campaign, after adding the 56% held by Andrea Radrizzani’s Aser Ventures to their previous 44% minority stake, with Paraag Marathe taking on the role of chairman.

In addition, there has been another interesting change in Leeds United’s shareholders, as Red Bull bought a minority stake in May 2024, which reportedly amounted to 10%.

Marathe said, “Red Bull’s addition is a historic milestone that will further empower the club to reach its full competitive potential.”

A couple of weeks ago, Greek philanthropist Andreas Dracopoulos joined the Board following a personal investment.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Despite the success on the pitch, Leeds United still posted a large loss of £49m, though this was an improvement on the previous season’s £61m deficit.

Revenue rose £9m (7%) from £128m to £137m, while operating expenses were only up £1m from £204m to £205m and net interest payable dropped by two-thirds from £18m to £6m. However, profit on player sales was £9m lower, falling from £34m to £25m.

The main driver of the revenue growth was commercial, which shot up £15m (34%) from £43m to £58m, an incredible figure for the Championship, while gate receipts were slightly higher, up £1m from £31m to £32m.

This was more than enough to offset the £7m (12%) reduction in broadcasting income, due to a smaller parachute payment in the second season after relegation from the Premier League.

The wage bill increased by £19m (22%) from £84m to £103m, almost entirely due to a promotion bonus, though player amortisation decreased £13m (22%) from £59m to £46m and player impairment fell £4.5m from £7.5m to £3.0m. Other expenses were flat at £48m.

All but three Championship clubs have now published accounts for 2024/25 with only three of them managing to generate a profit, namely Luton Town £17.9m, Sheffield United £2.6m and Plymouth Argyle £0.3m.

In other words, it is very much normal for clubs to lose money in this ultra-competitive division, but Leeds’ £49m loss was comfortably the worst last season, ahead of Cardiff City £35.1m, Coventry City £21.6m and Norwich City £20.7m.

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Tottenham Hotspur are involved in a fight to stay up, currently just a single point above the relegation zone, which seems incredible for a club with their financial resources.

Managerial Changes

Their plight owes much to a great deal of upheaval this season, which has featured no fewer than three head coaches. First up was Thomas Frank, who replaced “Big” Ange Postecoglou after the Australian was sacked in June, but he was unable to replicate his success at Brentford, so the Dane was given his marching orders in February.

The club’s hierarchy then made the somewhat bizarre decision to appoint Igor Tudor, a man with a patchy managerial record, as well as zero experience of the Premier League.

After a run of very poor results, the Croatian was also relieved of his duties, leaving Roberto De Zerbi with the task of guiding Spurs to survival.

Executive Changes

There was another important change, as Executive Chairman Daniel Levy “stepped down” from his role as after nearly 25 years.

Levy had become the face of Spurs, overseeing every detail of the club’s operations, including the development of an impressive new stadium, though he was also accused of a lack of ambition by many fans, while his uncompromising transfer negotiations were infamous in the football world.

Following his departure, Vinai Venkatesham arrived as chief executive, a role he had already held at North London rivals, Arsenal, while ENIC director and private banker Peter Charrington was appointed non-executive chairman.

2024/25 Season

This is the second consecutive season that Tottenham have struggled in the Premier League, as they finished a lowly 17th in 2024/25, though they did win the Europa League, after defeating Manchester United in the final. Not only was this the club’s first major trophy since 2008, but it also gave them direct qualification to the Champions League.

However, this was the first time that Spurs had finished outside the top ten for 17 years, which was the main factor behind Postecoglou’s being given his P45.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Matters were no better off the pitch, as Tottenham’s pre-tax loss significantly widened from £26m to £121m, the club’s worst ever result, despite revenue rising £37m (7%) from £528m to £565m.

This revenue growth was more than offset by a steep increase in operating expenses, which shot up £79m (13%) from £589m to £668m, while net interest payable increased by £23m (48%) from £47m to £70m. In addition, profit from player sales dropped £29m from £82m to £53m.

The loss after tax was also up, rising from £26m to £95m, though the year-on-year deterioration was smaller, thanks to a £26m tax credit.

The club said that the revenue increase was “driven by our Europa League success alongside strong commercial performance across sponsorship, merchandising and stadium events”.

That said, net broadcasting income fell £5m (3%) from £167m to £162m, due to the “under-performance” of the team, which reduced domestic TV money.

However, there was good growth in the other revenue streams, as match receipts rose £20m (19%) from £106m to £126m, while commercial increased £22m (9%) from £255m to £277m.

Investment in the squad led to the wage bill increasing by £34m (15%) from £222m to £256m, while player amortisation rose £6m (4%) from £136m to £142m.

In addition, exceptional charges for onerous employment contracts were up from £2m to £12m, though depreciation fell £12m (17%), but it still came in at a hefty £57m.

Perhaps most striking was the increase in other expenses, which shot up £43m (27%) from £159m to £202m.

There was also substantial £23m growth in net interest payable, very largely driven by a revaluation of some warrants, which give the holders the right to purchase shares at a fixed price.

Tottenham’s £121m loss was the second highest in the Premier League in 2024/25, only surpassed by Chelsea’s barely credible £262m. Only one other club posted a loss of more than £100m, namely West Ham with £104m.

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This has been a somewhat confusing season for Nottingham Forest, as they are battling against relegation from the Premier League (for the third time in the four seasons since promotion), but have reached the quarter-finals of the Europa League.

Managerial Changes

The chaos is highlighted by the fact that they have had no fewer than four managers this season. The popular Nuno Espirito Santo left after a fallout over recruitment strategy with sporting director Edu in September, to be replaced by a very different coach in the shape of “Big” Ange Postecoglou.

However, the Attack-minded Australian lasted less than two months, before another spectacular shift to Sean Dyche, famed for his focus on defence. He lasted four months, before he was also shown the door, handing the poisoned chalice to Vitor Pereira, who led Wolves to safety last season.

2024/25 Season

The current trials and tribulations are in stark contrast to 2024/25, when Forest finished in an impressive seventh place, which earned them qualification for the Europa League.

This was the first time that Forest had secured European football in 30 years, so the club was fully justified in describing this as a “hugely successful and exciting campaign”.

On top of that, they reached the semi-finals of the FA Cup, where they were beaten by Manchester City, though crashed out of the Carabao Cup in the second round.

League Position

This represented a significant improvement on the previous season, when Forest finished 17th, one place above the relegation zone, though that was still a bit of an achievement, as they had suffered a 4-point deduction for breaching the Premier League’s Profitability and Sustainability Rules (PSR).

Their fans believed that justice had been done, as Forest did enough on the pitch to ensure survival, while others might argue that theri survival was only made possible by the financial excesses that resulted in the club failing to comply with the PSR targets.

Whatever your point of view, Forest deserve congratulations on the substantial progress made since Evangelos Marinakis became the club’s majority shareholder in May 2017. The Olympiacos owner has an 80% stake with the other 20% held by his associate Sokratis Kominakis.

At that point Forest had just finished a lowly 21st in the Championship, narrowly avoiding relegation to League One on goal difference, but there has been steady improvement since then, leading to promotion to England’s top flight in 2021/22, when they defeated Huddersfield Town in the play-off final.

However, football fans have short memories, so the focus now will be on whether Forest can avoid relegation.

Clearly, the club’s finances have dramatically changed during their time in the Premier League, so let’s take a look at their accounts for the 2024/25 season, which saw Forest “continue their progress”.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Despite the improvement on the pitch, Forest swung from a £12m pre-tax profit to a £79m loss, which represented a £91m decline, largely due to a significant decrease in profit from player sales, which dropped from £101m to just £7m.

More positively, revenue rose £32m (17%) from £190m to £222m, which was a big new club record, though this was largely offset by a steep increase in operating expenses, which were up £24m (9%) from £263m to £287m, while net interest payable was up £6m (38%) from £15m to £21m.

All of Forest’s main revenue streams were higher, most notably broadcasting, which shot up £29m (22%) from £130m to £159m, thanks to the much better league position.

In addition, commercial was up by around a third, increasing by £9m from £30m to £39m, while gate receipts rose £6m (41%) from £14m to £20m.

However, player loans fell £11m (72%) from £15m to £4m.

Forest continued to invest in the squad “to give the team the best opportunity to compete in the Premier League”.

As a result, Forest’s player amortisation increased by £7m (12%) from £62m to £69m, while they also booked a £5m impairment charge.

That said, wages only increased very slightly from £166m to £167m, which was good cost control, given that they would have paid out bonuses for European qualification.

However, other expenses continued to climb, rising £10m (31%) from £34m to £44m.

Following the deterioration, Forest’s £79m loss was one of the worst in the Premier League in 2024/25, only surpassed by Chelsea £262m, Tottenham £121m and West Ham £104m.

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AFC Bournemouth’s 2024/25 accounts covered a season when they finished ninth in the Premier League, which equalled their best ever result in 2016/17, but they improved on Eddie Howe’s team by achieving a record tally of 56 points.

The Cherries also reached the quarter-finals of the FA Cup, while playing some excellent football under highly regarded head coach Andoni Iraola.

League Position

It’s strange to think that as recently as 2008/09 Bournemouth finished 21st in League Two, when they were deducted 17 points for leaving administration without a Company Voluntary Agreement.

However, the trend is very much their friend, as the club has made steady progress since then. In fact, this season is their ninth in England’s top flight, in 11 years, while they have improved three years in a row since promotion from the Championship in 2021/22, coming 15th, 12th and 9th.

Ownership

Much of the recent improvement can be attributed to owner Bill Foley of Black Knight Football and Entertainment, who paid £120m for Maxim Demin’s 100% stake in Bournemouth in December 2022 to end the Russian’s 11 years tenure.

Foley already had experience in running a sports club, as he also owns the Vegas Golden Knights, a successful NHL franchise.

The American billionaire is clearly a very ambitious individual. On his arrival, he stated, “I certainly think we can be in Europe within five years.” At the time, that seemed like wishful thinking, but it does not seem to be out of the question these days.

The club itself mentioned a more down-to-earth objective, “Our focus was on improving football performance in the Premier League, while ensuring that the business was on a stable financial footing.”

This is particularly challenging for a club like Bournemouth, which has the smallest stadium in the Premier League (by far), so the question is how have they succeeded where so many others have failed?

Let’s try to answer that by looking at the latest accounts.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Bournemouth’s results off the pitch were also excellent, as they swung from a £66m pre-tax loss to a £15m profit, a significant improvement of £81m in the bottom line, mainly due to profit from player sales increasing from just £251k to £91m.

Revenue rose £21m (13%) from £161m to a club record £182m, while other operating income almost doubled from £9m to £17m.

However, this was more than offset by steep growth in operating expenses, which shot up £36m (16%) from £226m to £262m. in addition, net interest payable was up from £10.6m to £13.4m.

The main driver of Bournemouth’s revenue growth was broadcasting, which rose £12m (9%) from £136m to £148m. There was also a significant increase in commercial, which was up £8m (45%) from £19m to £27m, while match day was slightly higher, rising from £6.5m to £6.7m.

All three revenue streams set new club highs for the second year in a row.

Bournemouth continued to invest in the squad to boost their chances of surviving (and thriving) in the Premier League, so wages climbed £22m (16%) from £136m to £158m, while player amortisation increased £7m (12%) from £62m to £69m. Other expenses also grew £6m (23%) from £25m to £31m.

Bournemouth’s £14.9m profit is the second best result in the Premier League to date in 2024/25, just behind Liverpool’s £15.2m. They are the only two clubs that managed to make money last season.

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Portsmouth’s 2024/25 accounts covered their first season back in the Championship since 2011/12 , following promotion from League One the previous year.

After a “testing” start to the campaign that left them in the relegation zone, the club’s form steadily improved, so that they managed to retain their status in England’s second tier by finishing in a creditable 16th place.

League Position

Up until 2010, Pompey had enjoyed seven seasons in the Premier League, winning the FA Cup in 2008, then playing in the UEFA Cup, before suffering three rapid relegations, ending up in League Two.

They spent four seasons in England’s fourth tier, before securing promotion to League One in 2017, while it took them another seven years to get back to the Championship. In total, it took Portsmouth 12 years, two administrations and three points deductions to get back to the Championship,

Ownership

It’s not overly dramatic to say that Portsmouth were close to going out of existence at one stage, but they were saved by the fans, after the Supporters Trust took ownership of the club in April 2013. They managed to steady the ship, before Portsmouth began the slow road to recovery.

However, football clubs these days need owners with deep pockets, so in August 2017 the Trust approved the sale of the club to Tornante, an American company headed by former Disney chief executive Michael Eisner.

Recently, the 84-year-old Eisner started on succession planning by transfering 73.5% of his shares to his three sons (Breck, Eric and Anders), who now each own 24.5% of the club. However, Michael has retained a 26.5% stake and continues in his position as chairman.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Following promotion to the Championship, Portsmouth’s pre-tax loss slightly narrowed from £5.6m to £4.4m.

Revenue shot up £11.0m (80%) from £13.6m to £24.6m, but this was pretty much offset by the increased cost of competing in the higher division, as operating expenses rose £9.9m (52%) from £19.3m to £29.2m.

Profit on player sales also increased, but only to a relatively low £0.4m.

The club incurred interest payable for the first time since 2013/14, though this was just £0.2m.

Chief executive Andrew Cullen said, “We saw significant revenue growth in turnover, thanks to the nature of broadcasting and solidarity payments in the Championship and from increased match day and commercial revenues.”

The higher TV deal in the Championship led to broadcasting income more than quadrupling from £2.5m to £11.6m, while there was also good growth elsewhere, as match day rose £1.3m (19%) from £5.9m to £8.2m, while commercial was up £0.6m (13%) from £4.2m to £4.8m.

However, Portsmouth’s revenue growth was eaten up by higher costs, largely due to investment in the squad. Wages rose £6.8m (65%) from £10.6m to £17.4m, while player amortisation increased £0.7m (80%) from £0.9m to £1.6m. In addition, other expenses were up by around a third, rising from £6.9m to £9.0m.

Although losing money is never great news, Portsmouth’s £4.4m loss is actually one of the best results in the Championship to date. Only one club has managed to generate a profit – and that was just £0.3m at Plymouth Argyle.

The only clubs with smaller losses last season were Millwall £0.3m and Sunderland £4.0m, while many others lost much more, e.g. Cardiff City £35m, Coventry City £22m, Norwich City £21m and QPR £20m.

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Coventry City are in pole position for promotion to the Premier League, as they are currently top of the Championship, seven points ahead of second-placed Middlesbrough.

Furthermore, under head coach Frank Lampard, Coventry are by far the highest scorers in England’s second tier, continuing the improvement in form since “Super Frank” replaced Mark Robins in November 2024.

This took the Sky Blues to the Championship play-offs for the second time in three seasons, though they were narrowly defeated by Sunderland in the semi-finals.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Coventry have been on the rise for a while, as they were playing in League Two as recently as 2017/18 before Robins guided them up the leagues.

Ownership

Local businessman Doug King took ownership of the club in January 2023, initially through the acquisition of an 85% stake, then purchasing the remaining 15%.

The previous owners, London-based hedge fund SISU Capital, had saved the club from administration in 2007, but came under fire from many supporters in subsequent years for their penny pinching approach.

However, Coventry’s financial situation has been transformed since the change in ownership, as will be seen by a review of their latest accounts, which cover the 2024/25 season.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Despite the improvement in the league, Coventry found life more difficult off the pitch, as they swung from an £8.7m pre-tax profit to a £21.6m loss, a decline of £30.3m in the bottom line.

The positive was a large increase in revenue, which rose £4.8m (17%) from £29.3m to a club record £34.1m, but this was not enough to compensate for a significant reduction in profit from player sales, which dropped £20.6m from £23.7m to just £3.1m.

This was exacerbated by a steep rise in operating expenses, which increased by a third, up £14.7m from £44.2m to £58.9m.

The loss after tax was slightly smaller at £21.3m, due to a £0.3m research and development tax credit.

Once again, all three revenue streams increased, led by match day, which rose £2.2m (22%) from £10.0m to £12.2m, though broadcasting was not far behind, as this was up £2.1m (20%) from £10.1m to £12.2m. Commercial was £0.7m (7%) higher at £9.8m.

However, the revenue growth was more than offset by investment in the squad and infrastructure, as Coventry played catch-up for the years of neglect under the former owners.

As a result, the wage bill rose £3.1m (13%) from £23.4m to £26.5m, while player amortisation shot up £5.8m (69%) from £8.3m to £14.1m. In addition, depreciation increased by £0.5m (66%) from £0.8m to £1.3m, while other expenses grew by £5.3m (46%) from £11.7m to £17.0m.

Just over half of the Championship clubs have so far published accounts for 2024/25 with only one of them managing to generate a profit – and that was just £0.3m at Plymouth Argyle.

So it’s no surprise to see a club in England’s second tier post a loss, though Coventry’s £21.6m deficit is the second worst to date, only surpassed by Cardiff City’s £35.1m.

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Despite last night’s unexpected defeat to Charlton Athletic, these are exciting times for Middlesbrough, as they are currently second in the Championship, only behind leaders Coventry City, with the team playing some exciting football under head coach Kim Hellberg.

There had been some concern when the young Swede replaced Rob Edwards in November after his somewhat acrimonious move to Wolves, but the team has continued to flourish in its latest promotion campaign.

League Position

Clearly, every club in England’s second tier is desperate to secure promotion to the promised land of the Premier League, but Middlesbrough have a more realistic chance than most, given the backing of owner Steve Gibson.

They were last promoted in 2015/16, but only lasted one season in the top flight. Since then, they have twice qualified for the play-offs and finished just outside the top six on three occasions, but have not quite managed to get over the line.

However, last season was fairly disappointing, as they only finished tenth, which led to Michael Carrick’s dismissal. They also went out early in the FA Cup, losing to Blackburn Rovers in the third round, and the Carabao Cup, eliminated by Stoke City in the second round.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Middlesbrough’s pre-tax loss slightly reduced from £12.4m to £11.4m, thanks to profit from player sales improving by £9.2m from £17.1m to £26.3m.

Revenue was also a little higher, rising £0.3m (1%) from £32.2m to £32.5m, though there was a steep increase in operating expenses, which rose £7.9m (13%) from £62.5m to £70.4m, while net interest payable more than doubled from £0.5m to £1.1m.

The loss after tax also narrowed from £9.6m to £8.2m, after taken into consideration a £3.2m tax credit.

The only revenue stream that grew was broadcasting, as the uplift in the central TV rights led to a £2.5m (26%) increase from £9.7m to £12.2m. However, match day fell £1.5m (14%) from £10.9m to £9.4m, while commercial dropped £0.8m (7%) from £11.7m to £10.9m.

Investment in Middlesbrough’s squad led to steep increases in both wages, up £5.0m (16%) from £31.4m to £36.4m, and player amortisation, up £2.2m (24%) from £9.2m to £11.4m.

Depreciation rose £0.5m (19%) from £2.8m to £3.3m, while other expenses were also higher, up £0.2m (1%) from £19.1m to £19.3m.

Almost half of the Championship clubs have now published accounts for 2024/25 with only one of them managing to generate a profit – and that was just £0.3m at Plymouth Argyle.

In fact, Middlesbrough’s £11.4m loss was actually one of the better results, compared to some of the hefty losses reported elsewhere, e.g. Cardiff City £35m, Coventry City £22m and Norwich City £21m, though Millwall’s loss was just £0.3m.

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This season has proved to be quite challenging for Liverpool, as the defence of their title has been more difficult than most observers would have anticipated, given the manner in which the Reds triumphed last season.

The club described 2024/25 as “successful”, which was fair enough, given that they not only won the Premier League, but also returned to the Champions League, though they were eliminated in the last 16 by eventual winners Paris Saint-Germain.

In addition, they reached the final of the Carabao Cup, where they were defeated by Newcastle United, but were the victims of a classic giant killing in the FA Cup, when they lost to Plymouth Argyle in the fourth round.

Fans would have been concerned after the departure of the hugely charismatic Jürgen Klopp, but Arne Slot proved an inspired choice as his replacement, having been brought in from Feyenoord. That said, there have been a few more questions raised about the loquacious Dutchman this season.

League Position

This was the second time that Liverpool had been victorious in England’s top flight in the last six years, enabling them to claim their 20th league title. They also finished runners-up and came third twice in this period, so they have done well on the pitch by anyone’s standards, which has fed into their financial results.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Liverpool returned to profitability last season, as they swung from a pre-tax loss of £57m to a profit of £15m, a big improvement of £72m in the bottom line.

Revenue shot up £89m (14%) from £614m to a club record £703m, while profit on player sales more than doubled from £22m to £53m.

However, there was steep growth in operating expenses, which rose £61m (9%) from £684m to £745m, though net interest payable slightly decreased from £9.4m to £8.5m.

The profit after tax was smaller at £8m, due to a £7m tax charge.

One of the main drivers of the growth in Liverpool’s revenue was playing in the more lucrative Champions League, as opposed to the Europa League the previous season, which led to a steep increase in broadcasting, up £60m (29%) from £204m to £264m.

There were also increases in match day, up £14m (14%) from £102m to £116m, and commercial, up £15m (5%) from £308m to £323m. Both these revenue streams established new club highs.

Jenny Beacham said, “We make no secret of our desire to run and  operate a financially sustainable club, to grow revenue streams, and to do all we can off the pitch to help bring more success on it.”

The chief financial officer added, “The 2024/25 season is a great example of how this can work, with record revenues alongside the men’s team winning our 20th league title.”

However, Beacham admitted, “The club does face significant cost challenges, including rises in administrative, staffing and operational costs, alongside the need for us to compete at the highest level of the game across our men and women’s teams.”

As a result, there was a sharp increase in the cost base. Wages surged £42m (11%) from £386m to £428m, another club record, though player amortisation was only slightly higher, rising £3m (2%) from £114m to £117m. Other operating expenses also climbed by £19m (11%) from £167m to £186m.

This explains why Liverpool “only” made £15m profit, despite winning the Premier League and playing in the Champions League.

That said, this achievement should not be under-stated, as Liverpool are actually the only Premier League club to have posted a profit to date in 2024/25.

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Less than three years after European glory, when they defeated Fiorentina in Prague to win the UEFA Conference League, West Ham are involved in a relegation battle.

It’s fair to say that the club is in a state of turmoil, not helped by a classic example of the managerial merry-go-round. In fact, the Hammers have tried no fewer than four managers in the last 18 months.

Long-serving manager David Moyes left at the end of the 2023/24 season after his contract expired, when he was replaced by Julen Lopetegui, but the Spanish coach only lasted eight months before he was relieved of his duties.

Graham Potter was next to take the hot seat, but his reign also ended after just eight months, while the club parted company with director of football Tim Steidten at the same time.

The current coach is Nuno Espirito Santo, who was handed the poisoned chalice in September, with the club hoping that his Premier League experience at Wolves, Tottenham and Nottingham Forest will stand him in good stead.

League Position

West Ham finished 14th in the league last season, which the club described as “ultimately disappointing” and “below expectations”. They were as high as sixth as recently as 2020/21, so there has been a steady decline.

However, they pointed out that they were still “able to secure the core aim of maintaining Premier League status for a fourteenth consecutive season, which remains the longest period the club has remained in the top flight in the modern era.”

They were also unsuccessful in the domestic cups, going out in the third round in both competitions: beaten by Aston Villa in the FA Cup and Liverpool in the Carabao Cup.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Things look no better for West Ham off the pitch, as they swung from a £57m pre-tax profit to a £104m loss in 2024/25, the worst result in the club’s history.

This represented a massive £161m deterioration in the bottom line, largely driven by profit on player sales falling £76m from £96m to £20m, while revenue also dropped £42m (16%) from £270m to £228m.

Despite the steep reduction in the top line, operating expenses still rose £29m (9%) from £307m to £366m, while interest payable more than doubled from £8m to £19m.

The revenue decline was basically driven by West Ham being less successful on the pitch, which meant a lower position in the Premier League, while the previous season benefited from participation in the Europa League.

This led to reductions in all three revenue streams, especially broadcasting, which was down £35m (21%) from £167m to £132m. Match day dropped £6m (12%) from £45m to £39m, while commercial fell £2m (4%) from £58m to £56m.

In addition, other operating income decreased from £6.9m to £3.9m.

However, West Ham continued to invest in the squad, leading to growth in both wages, which rose £15m (9%) from £161m to £176m, and player amortisation, up £16m (19%) from £83m to £99m.

Both these staff costs set new club records, though other expenses slightly fell by £2m (3%) from £60m to £58m.

West Ham’s £104m loss is the second largest so far reported for 2024/25, only surpassed by Tottenham’s £127m (according to UEFA’s Club Finance and Investment Landscape report).

According to the same UEFA report, Chelsea suffered an enormous loss of £350m, though this has been adjusted for various non-cash items, so the figure in the club accounts will be very different. For example, in 2023/24 the Blues reported a £128m profit, but that was only thanks to a £199m profit from the sale of their women’s team to another group company.

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Arsenal’s 2024/25 financial results cover a season that included “strong performances” in both the Champions League, where they reached the semi-finals, and the Premier League, where they finished as runners-up to Liverpool.

The Gunners also reached the semi-finals of the EFL Cup, before losing to Newcastle United, but were eliminated in the third round of the FA Cup by Manchester United

While results on the pitch were clearly excellent overall, the club acknowledged that the objective was “to compete for and win trophies”, so it was good news that Arsenal Women delivered some silverware after defeating the mighty Barcelona in a thrilling Champions League final.

League Position

On the men’s side, it has been a case of “close, but no cigar” for a while, as Arsenal have finished second in each of the last three seasons. Although that represents a marked improvement on their eighth place in 2020/21, when they failed to qualify for Europe, this has been a source of much frustration.

As it stands, this season looks promising, though very few Gooners will be “counting their chickens before they hatch”.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Arsenal’s pre-tax loss significantly reduced for the second year in a row, falling from £18m to just £1m, so they effectively broke-even.

The improvement was driven by good growth in (football) revenue, which shot up £76m (13%) from £614m to a new club record £690m, while profit from player sales also greatly increased by £30m from £51m to £81m.

However, this was partially offset by substantial growth in operating expenses, which rose £91m (14%) from £663m to £754m, though net interest payable was largely unchanged at £18m.

In fact, Arsenal would have posted a profit last season if they had not booked a £15m exceptional player impairment charge.

If that once-off payment is excluded, they swung from an £18m loss to a £14m profit.

All three of Arsenal’s main revenue streams set new club highs. The largest increase came in commercial, which rose £45m (21%) from £218m to £263m, as the new commercial strategy has started to pay off.

Success on the pitch led to growth in both match day, up £22m (17%) from £132m to £154m, and broadcasting, up £11m (4%) from £262m to £273m.

Player loans income dropped from £1.4m to £0.5m.

Further significant investment in the squad led to an increase in wages, which rose £19m (6%) from £328m to £347m, another new club record. Player amortisation was only slightly higher at £172m, though there was a £15m impairment charge.

In addition, there was striking growth in other operating expenses, which shot up by more than a third (£55m) from £146m to £201m.

Although it’s rarely good news to lose money, Arsenal’s tiny £1m loss is actually the best result to date for the Premier League in 2024/25, as all the other clubs that have so far published accounts have all suffered larger losses, ranging from Manchester City’s £10m to West Ham’s horrific £104m.

Furthermore, according to UEFA’s Club Finance and Investment Landscape report, the likes of Chelsea, Tottenham and Aston Villa have all made enormous losses in 2024/25, which will be confirmed when they publish their detailed accounts.

Based on the latest available accounts the only two clubs that managed to generate a profit were Luton Town and Sheffield United, who both ended up being relegated, demonstrating that it is difficult to get the balance right.

In addition, Liverpool have just announced a profit after tax of £8m after winning the Premier League last season, but we will have to wait for the full accounts for the pre-tax figure.

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Queens Park Rangers’ 2024/25 financial results covered a season that was eerily similar to the previous year, as they once again endured a “difficult start”, finding themselves bottom of the Championship, though made a strong recovery to finish in 15th place, which was actually their best result for three years.

Nevertheless, head coach Marti Cifuentes was dismissed in June, despite the board appreciating his “efforts in stabilising the performances of the club during the 23/24 season and in ensuring our safety in the 24/25 season”.

He was replaced by French coach Julien Stéphan, who has previously managed at Rennes and Strasbourg.

League Position

Having spent three out of the four seasons between 2011/12 and 2014/15 in the Premier League, QPR are now in their 11th season in a row in the Championship.

They have spent most of this period in the bottom half of the table with their best finish being ninth in 2020/21, while the last three seasons have all involved (ultimately successful) battles against relegation.

To date, this season’s campaign has proved more comfortable, as Rangers currently find themselves mid-table in the Championship, 14 points above the relegation zone and only four points below the play-off places.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

QPR’s pre-tax loss widened from £13.5m to £20.3m, despite revenue rising £2.1m (8%) from £25.9m to £28.0m and profit on player sales slightly increasing from £2.2m to £2.3m.

This was more than offset by a steep increase in operating expenses, which rose £7.7m (19%) from £41.1m to £48.8m, while net interest payable almost tripled from £0.6m to £1.5m.

The revenue growth was very largely driven by the new EFL TV rights deal, which led to broadcasting increasing £2.5m (27%) from £9.3m to £11.8m, as there were small reductions in the other two revenue streams.

Gate receipts fell £0.1m (2%) from £6.9m to £6.8m, while commercial was down £0.3m (2%) from £9.7m to £9.4m.

Following some investment in the squad, QPR’s staff costs increased. As a result, wages rose £3.7m (15%) from £23.8m to £27.5m, while player amortisation shot up £0.9m (55%) from £1.6m to £2.5m.

In addition, other expenses increased by £2.1m (15%) from £13.5m to £15.6m, while depreciation rose £1.1m (54%) from £2.2m to £3.3m.

Seven Championship clubs have to date published accounts for 2024/25 with only one of them managing to generate a profit – and that was just £0.3m at Plymouth Argyle.

Nevertheless, QPR £20.1m pre-tax loss is the second largest so far, only “beaten” by Norwich City’s £20.7m.

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Brentford’s prospects looked rather bleak this summer, as their highly regarded head coach, Thomas Frank, had opted to move to Tottenham. The popular Dane was replaced by the inexperienced Keith Andrews, the club’s set piece coach, which came as a surprise to most observers

In addition, the Bees lost their two top scorers from the previous season, as Bryan Mbeumo and Yoane Wissa were sold to Manchester United and Newcastle United respectively, while their captain Christian Nørgaard moved to Arsenal.

However, Brentford have confounded expectations, so they currently sit in a very impressive seventh place, once again demonstrating the club’s ability to punch above its weight.

Brentford now find themselves in an interesting position, as their financial resources are far behind the vast majority of their rivals in the top flight, so there is some pressure on their traditional sustainable model, if they wish to compete.

Let’s take a look at their latest accounts from the 2024/25 season to better understand the challenges facing Brentford, which will help explain some of the recent moves off the pitch.

2024/25 Season

These financial results covered a season where they finished tenth in the Premier League, thus securing their place in the top flight for the fifth consecutive year.

In addition, they reached the quarter-finals of the Carabao Cup, where they were eliminated by Newcastle United, but crashed out of the FA Cup in the third round after a home defeat by Plymouth Argyle.

League Position

This was the second time that the Bees had achieved a top ten finish since their promotion to England’s top flight, representing a strong recovery from the previous season’s 16th place finish.

Brentford have clearly come a long way, as they were playing in League Two as recently as 2008/09. Supported by their owner Matthew Benham, who fully bought the club in June 2012, in terms of both financial contributions and a smart, data-led recruitment policy, the club has made great progress on and off the pitch.

As chief executive Jon Varney put it, “This is an exciting time for Brentford. The club has enjoyed significant success in recent years.”

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

However, the price of competing in the Premier League was highlighted by Brentford’s pre-tax loss almost tripling from £7.9m to £20.5m, despite revenue increasing by £6.6m (4%) from £166.5m to a new club record of £173.1m.

In addition, profit from player sales rose £2.0m (8%) from £25.2m to £27.2m, other operating income almost doubled from £5.4m to £10.2m and the club made £8.8m from a property deal.

This was more than offset by growth in the cost base, as operating expenses shot up £30.9m (15%) from £201.2m to £232.1m, while net interest payable doubled from £3.9m to £7.8m.

The loss after tax also widened from £7.5m to £17.7m.

The revenue growth was driven by a higher finishing position in the Premier League, which led to an increase in broadcasting of £12.0m (9%) from £127.5m to £139.5m.

Match day also rose £1.1m (9%) from £11.3m to £12.4m, but there was a dip in commercial income, which fell £6.5m (24%) from £27.7m to £21.2m (due to lower player loans).

Further “significant” investment in the playing squad drove increases in staff costs, as wages rose £16.4m (14%) from £114.4m to £130.8m and player amortisation shot up by a third (£12.2m) from £35.6m to £47.8m.

There was also steep growth in depreciation, up £2.7m (31%) from £8.7m to £11.4m, mainly due to more expenditure on the new stadium, but other expenses were flat at £42.1m.

Only four Premier League clubs have so far published accounts for 2024/25 – and they’ve all lost money. Brentford’s £21m loss was the second smallest, only bettered by Manchester City’s £10m deficit, while Manchester United and Brighton both had significantly higher losses with £40m and £56m respectively.

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Even after a couple of defeats this month, Preston North End are still among the clubs fighting for promotion from the EFL Championship, which has come as a surprise to many fans.

Chairman Craig Hemming had an explanation, “We have invested considerable sums in strengthening the squad over the summer and have made a very encouraging start to this season.”

This followed a significant overhauling of the squad, as many new players arrived at Deepdale, though most of them were brought in as free transfers or loan signings.

As Hemmings put it, “This transfer window more than any other in my tenure as Chairman is about revolution and not evolution. Paul Heckingbottom and his coaching staff have a significant opportunity to reshape the football squad into the team and style of play they believe needed to compete for the play-off places.”

League Position

Preston’s performance this season is all the more startling, given that they finished in a lowly 20th place in 2024/25, just one point above the relegation zone.

More positively, they enjoyed a couple of good cup runs, reaching the quarter-finals of the FA Cup and the fourth round of the Carabao Cup, only going out to Premier League opposition, namely Aston Villa and Arsenal respectively.

This was Preston’s tenth consecutive season competing in the Championship. In fact, up until 2024/25, they had been the very definition of a mid-table club, finishing between 7th and 14th, which is not to be sniffed at.

Hemmings said, “We have consistently punched above our weight in the league (despite last year’s timely reminder of how difficult the Championship can be).”

The chairman added, “As our end of season struggles proved, being in the Championship is not a given, it is something earned by hard work, endeavour, professionalism and constant investment, both on and off field.”

Indeed, Preston have to compete with far fewer resources than most of their rivals, especially those without parachute payments, so let’s take a look at the state of the club’s finances.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

As well as the decline on the pitch, Preston’s pre-tax loss worsened from £14.3m to £17.7m, despite revenue rising £3.6m (21%) from £16.9m to £20.5m, a new club high.

This was more than offset by a steep increase in operating expenses, up £6.7m (21%) from £31.6m to £38.3m. In addition, they made nothing from player sales, though the previous season was not so hot either, only contributing £0.4m.

The result after tax was better, thanks to a £4.3m tax credit, though this still widened from £9.9m to £13.4m.

There was growth across the board, as all three revenue streams set new club records. The largest increase was in broadcasting, which rose £2.3m (25%) from £9.5m to £11.8m, but match day was up £1.1m (25%) from £4.3m to £5.4m. In addition, commercial was slightly higher, rising £0.2m (7%) From £3.1m to £3.3m.

The club explained, “The increase in turnover mainly relates to ticket income from Championship and FA Cup matches and increased income from the EFL and Premier League central funding distributions.”

However, the revenue increase was eaten up by cost growth, following investment in the squad. Wages rose £4.4m (20%) from £22.0m to £26.4m and player amortisation shot up £1.5m (74%) from £2.1m to £3.6m. In addition, other expenses grew £0.7m (11%) from £6.4m to £7.1m.

Only six Championship clubs have to date published accounts for 2024/25, so the vast majority of the comparatives for other clubs are from the previous 2023/24 season.

Preston’s £17.7m loss was obviously far from great, but to be fair no fewer than 18 clubs in this ultra-competitive division lost more than £10m.

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Plymouth Argyle’s form has picked up lately, which was very much needed after a really disappointing start to the season, when they lost 12 of their first 18 games in League One.

Simon Hallett is painfully aware of the falling off in the club’s fortunes on the pitch, “Just over a year ago, we were mid-table in the Championship. Today we are in a relegation fight in League One. That is a steep, rapid and painful change. There is no point pretending otherwise.”

The chairman explained the reasons for the decline in this way, “Over the last 18 months we have made too many decisions that did not work. Some of the structures and processes that helped us succeed in previous seasons eroded. We changed too much, too quickly, on and off the pitch.”

Managerial Changes

Chief executive, Paul Berne, agreed that there have been too many changes, “I feel that the club has been through an enormous period of instability, both on and off the pitch.”

Since Steve Schumacher was headhunted by Stoke City two years ago, the club has employed no fewer than four coaches. The first to be given his opportunity was Ian Foster, the former England U-20 coach, but he lasted less than three months.

He was succeeded by no less a figure than Wayne Rooney, one of the greatest English footballers of all time, but his managerial reign was far less successful than his time as a player, so he left in December 2024 with Argyle bottom of the table.

Miron Muslic did reaasonably well, but then disappointed the club with “the timing and manner of his leaving” in May, though they acknowledged that the Bosnian had joined a club with a great profile in Schalke 04. The current holder of the poisoned chalice is the inexperienced Tom Cleverley, who was sacked by Watford after just 12 months as manager.

Little wonder that Hallett observed, “We also continued to fail to find stability in our head coach role.”

There have been some other important changes off the pitch, as Director of Football, Neil Dewsnip, was replaced by Derek Adams, while chief executive Andrew Parkinson was succeeded by Paul Berne.

League Position

In light of the recent issues, it’s worth remembering that Argyle have still come a long way since they entered administration in 2011. That led to the club being deducted 10 points, which resulted in relegation to League Two, where they only just avoided dropping out of the football league.

James Brent bought the club, took it out of administration and steadied the ship. He then stepped aside in 2018, allowing Hallett to become majority shareholder before taking on the role of chairman.

His arrival was not enough to prevent another relegation to the fourth tier, but the club bounced back at the first attempt.

As Hallett explained, “Over the past five or six years, we have set out a clear pathway to achieving success at Argyle. In that time, we progressed from League Two to the Championship, where we spent two seasons, before suffering relegation.”

2024/25 Season

The club described 2024/25 as “a disappointing year on the pitch”, which was fair comment, given that it ended with relegation, though Hallett pointed out that “it was the first season in several years in which we failed to get results that were significantly better than were implied by our football budget.”

There were a couple of high points, as Argyle defeated two Premier League opponents in the FA Cup, Liverpool and Brentford, before being eliminated by Manchester City in the fifth round.

Throughout all their ups and downs, Argyle have strived to be financially sustainable, so let’s take a look at the latest accounts to see how they have performed against this objective.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Despite relegation, Argyle actually managed to generate a pre-tax profit of £0.3m, following a £2.4m loss the previous season. The club said this was “the result of success in player trading, which overcame significant costs of competing in the Championship”.

Indeed, profit on player sales shot up from just £0.8m to £6.1m, while the figures also benefited from an increase in revenue, which rose £3.2m (13%) from £25.6m to a club record £28.8m. In addition, other operating income increased from £0.3m to £2.7m.

This was partly offset by further growth in operating expenses, which rose £8.2m (28%) from £29.3m to £37.5m.

Thanks to a £0.2m tax credit, the profit after tax was slightly higher at £0.5m.

The main driver of Argyle’s revenue growth was broadcasting, thanks to the new EFL TV rights deal, which led to an increase of £2.3m (22%) from £10.6m to £12.9m. However, there was also good growth elsewhere, as match day rose £0.4m (9%) from £5.5m to £5.9m, while commercial was up £0.4m (5%) from £9.6m to £10.0m.

Consequently, there were new club records for each revenue stream.

Much of Argyle’s revenue growth was eaten up by higher expenses, following investment in the squad. Wages rose £4.4m (26%) from £16.8m to £21.2m, while player amortisation more than doubled from £1.0m to £2.2m.

In addition, other expenses rose £2.2m (22%) from £10.1m to £12.3m, while depreciation was up by a third from £1.1m to £1.4m.

Only six Championship clubs have to date published accounts for 2024/25, so the vast majority of the comparatives for other clubs are from the 2023/24 season.

However, Argyle are the only club to so far show a profit last season, with the next best result being Hull City’s £10.2m loss, while the largest loss to date is Norwich City’s £20.7m.

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Brighton and Hove Albion’s 2024/25 accounts cover a season that reflected “another year of decent progress both on and off the pitch for the club”, according to owner Tony Bloom.

The Seagulls finished in an impressive 8th place, the second highest league position in their history, under head coach Fabian Hürzeler, the youngest ever in the Premier League at just 31 years of age.

League Position

This was the eighth season in which Brighton had competed in the Premier League after promotion from the Championship in 2016/17. Most impressively, they have finished in the top ten on three occasions in the last four years.

As recently as 2010/11, they were playing in League One, so they have “come a long way, baby”, as celebrity fan Fatboy Slim might say.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Brighton swung from a £75m pre-tax profit to a £56m loss, a significant £131m decline, largely due to a reduction in profit on player sales, which almost halved, falling £53m from £110m to £57m.

Revenue was flat at £222m, but operating expenses shot up £67m (26%) from £262m to £329m, while net interest went from £2m receivable to £1m payable.

The impact of the Monks Farm development was a £9.4m loss, based on £20.3m revenue and £29.7m cost of sales, compared to a £1.4m loss the previous year.

If this revenue were included, total turnover would be up to £243m, down £18m (7%) from £261m.

The loss after tax was smaller at £51m after considering a £5m tax credit. The prior year’s £60m profit has been restated, as the club had not recognised a deferred tax asset.

The decrease in broadcasting income, which fell £13m (8%) from £164m to £151m, was offset by an increase in commercial income, up £12m (41%) from £31m to £43m. Match day was unchanged at £28m.

There was significant investment in the playing squad, which led to steep increases in staff costs, as the wage bill rose £19m (13%) from £146m to £165m and player amortisation more than doubled, rising by £43m from £39m to £82m.

Other expenses, excluding Monks Farm costs, increased by £10m (14%) from £65m to £75m.

Only three Premier League clubs have so far published accounts for 2024/25, so comparisons with all the others are based on the latest available figures from the 2023/24 season.

However, it is evident that Brighton’s £56m pre-tax loss will be one of the worst results in England’s top flight last season. In fact, only three clubs posted worse figures in 2023/24, namely Aston Villa £86m, Bournemouth £66m and Liverpool £57m, though three-quarters of the division lost money.

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Hull City are currently in the mix for promotion to the Premier League after an excellent first half of the season, which has taken them to just outside the play-off places.

Given the team’s struggles last season, when the Tigers only secured safety on the final day, and the financial issues widely reported this summer, this has come as something of a surprise to most observers.

Transfer Ban

The club’s finances have come under scrutiny after the EFL imposed a transfer ban after Hull had accrued 30 days of late payments in the 12-month period from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025, relating to money owed to Aston Villa for the Louie Barry loan and payments to various suppliers.

Following an appeal by the club, the sanction was reduced to two transfer windows with a third window suspended, thus impacting last summer and this January.

The club blamed these delays on “administrative errors” and “misunderstandings”, but the EFL’s decision did not exactly inspire confidence.

One immediate result was that a couple of deals that the club had already announced to bring in Gustavo Puerta and Reda Laalaoui had to be scrapped.

There were some arrivals in the summer, as City explained, “As we have demonstrated in recent weeks, we still remain able to sign players – either on loan or as free agents”, though they do have to be in line with a business plan submitted to the league.

Late Wages

In addition, towards the end of last season, there was a delay in paying player wages, which was explained as “a result of an overseas payment not yet being cleared into the club’s account”.

Players ended up receiving their wages only 48 hours late, but these cash flow issues could be considered as another “red flag”.

Ownership

It wasn’t meant to be this way after Acun Ilıcalı purchased Hull City in January 2022. The new owner had initially restored the club’s relationship with its fans after ending the Allam family’s controversial tenure.

The Turkish businessman has shown much more ambition, spending big (relatively speaking) since his arrival to improve the club’s chances of promotion to the Premier League.

He remains bullish about the club’s prospects, so will feel somewhat vindicated by the team’s good form this season.

That said, he has admitted that he is “open to outside investment”, though he was at pains to emphasise that this was absolutely not because “we have financial problems”.

League Position

While Hull did reach the Premier League on the Allams’ watch, enjoying a total of three seasons in the top flight, they also dropped down to League One under their control and spending on the squad had effectively dried up.

2024/25 Season

Following Ilıcalı’s takeover, Hull had been very much on an upward trend before a reality check last season, when they finished 21st, only avoiding relegation on goal difference.

Given that they had finished in an impressive 7th place the year before, when they missed out on the Championship play-offs by just three points, this represented a steep deterioration.

Managerial Changes

Many attributed the decline to Ilıcalı’s somewhat baffling decision to sack manager Liam Rosenior. He was replaced by Tim Walter, but the hapless German lasted less than six months, as he was dismissed following a run of four straight defeats and nine games without a win (plus some unwise criticism of his own supporters).

Former Southampton and Reading manager Rubén Sellés was then handed the reins in December, but he was also given his P45 at the end of the season, despite steering City to safety.

The firing of the Spanish coach came despite the accounts putting a positive spin on the team’s performance, “The season presented both challenges and opportunities, culminating in success as the club secured its divisional status.”

This meant that Ilıcalı removed three managers in just 12 months. Indeed, he has gone through no fewer than five managers since his arrival four years ago, also including Grant McCann and former Georgian international Shota Arveladze in 2022.

There was understandable concern when Sergej Jakirovic was appointed head coach, given his lack of experience in England, but the man from Bosnia and Herzegovina has done well to date.

As can be seen, there’s been a lot going on at Hull City, so let’s take a look at the latest financial results, which represent the third full season under the Turkish media mogul’s ownership.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Despite their problems on the pitch, Hull’s pre-tax loss actually reduced from £18.8m to £10.2m in 2024/25, mainly thanks to a significant improvement in profit on player sales from £8.3m to £33.1m.

In addition, revenue rose £4.6m (22%) from £21.2m to £25.8m, though investment in the squad led to steep growth in operating expenses, which increased by £19.8m (42%) from £47.7m to £67.5m, while net interest more than doubled from £0.7m to £1.6m.

Hull said that they had recorded “strong revenue growth”. The largest increase was in broadcasting, which surged £3.1m (33%) from £9.4m to £12.5m, though match day was up £1.5m (25%) from £5.7m to £7.2m. Commercial was flat at £6.1m.

However, the cost of Hull’s renewed ambition was reflected in the wage bill, which shot up £7.1m (24%) from £29.6m to £36.7m, while player amortisation more than doubled from £4.7m to £10.4m. Furthermore, other expenses increased by £7.1m (54%) from £13.2m to £20.3m.

Six Championship clubs have to date published accounts for 2024/25 with only one of them posting a (small) profit, namely Plymouth Argyle with £0.3m. Hull City’s £10.2m loss was actually the next best result, just ahead of Derby County £11.1m.

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Bristol City’s 2024/25 accounts cover a season when they finished 6th in the Championship, their best result since back in 2007/08, which qualified them for the play-offs, though the wheels came off in the semi-final, as they were beaten by Sheffield United 6-0 on aggregate. However, the club pointed out that this represented an improvement of five positions on the previous year.

League Position

It was City’s tenth consecutive season in the Championship since promotion from League One in 2014/15, but this was the first time that they had made the play-offs. That said, the trend is their friend, as they have improved their league position four years in a row.

Following the end of the season, Liam Manning left for Championship rivals, Norwich City, replaced by Austrian coach Gerhard Struber, whose CV includes such diverse clubs as Barnsley, New York Red Bulls, Red Bull Salzburg and Cologne.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Despite the improvement on the pitch, Bristol City’s pre-tax loss significantly increased from £3.3m to £18.6m, mainly due to a much lower profit from player sales, which dropped from £21.7m to £6.0m.

This was exacerbated by a reduction in revenue, which fell £2.5m (6%) from (restated) £42.8m to £40.3m, though operating expenses were cut £2.5m (4%) from £65.4m to £62.9m and net interest payable decreased £0.4m (16%) to £2.3m.

City chief executive Tom Rawcliffe observed, “Although the loss is evidently larger than last year, it is in line with expectations and highlights the positive financial impact a large player sale and successful player trading model can have.”

The main driver of the lower revenue was commercial, which fell £5.8m (23%) from £25.4m to £19.6m, though match day was also down £0.3m (4%) from £7.7m to £7.4m. This was partially offset by broadcasting, which rose £3.7m (37%) from £9.7m to £13.4m.

Investment in the squad led to increases in both the wage bill, which rose £1.0m (3%) from £34.9m to £35.9m, and player amortisation, which shot up £1.7m (51%) from £3.2m to £4.9m. In contrast, other expenses decreased by £5.2m (21%) from £24.0m to £18.8m.

Only five Championship clubs have to date published accounts for 2023/24 with just one of them posting a (small) profit, namely Plymouth Argyle with £0.3m. Of the others, only Norwich City had a larger loss than City with £20.7m.

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Manchester City’s 2024/25 accounts cover a season when they finished third in the Premier League and reached the FA Cup final, where they were surprisingly beaten by Crystal Palace.

On the international stage, they advanced to the knockout round of the Champions League, where they were eliminated by Real Madrid, while they also reached the last 16 in the expanded FIFA Club World Cup, where they lost to Saudi club Al-Hilal.

For most clubs, this would be a more than satisfactory season, but City admitted that this represented a “disappointing outcome”, which was perfectly understandable, considering that they had won the league six times in the previous seven years.

Indeed, Khaldoon Al Mubarak described this as “a testing one for Manchester City, with our men’s first team ending the season without a trophy for the first time in eight years.”

The chairman added, “There is no doubt that last season’s football results were less than we had hoped for.”

His view was echoed by chief executive Ferran Soriano, who drily commented, “We saw results on the pitch that were below our expectations.”

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

City’s less successful results on the pitch contributed to a deterioration in the club’s financials, as they swung from a hefty £74m pre-tax profit to a £10m loss, but the main factor was a £44m reduction in profit on player sales from £139m to £95m.

Revenue also fell £21m (3%) from a club record £715m to £694m, exacerbated by a £10m (1%) increase in operating expenses from £780m to £790m, while net finance costs more than doubled from £5m to £12m.

The club described the revenue decrease as “minimal, despite on-pitch performance not delivering previous seasons’ results”.

That said, there were reductions in all three revenue streams, especially broadcasting, which fell £16m (5%) from £295m to £279m. Commercial also dropped £5m (1%) from £345m to £340m, while match day slightly decreased from £75.6m to £75.1m.

Less success (and therefore lower performance bonuses) was also a factor in the reduction in the wage bill, which dropped £5m (1%) from £413m to £408m, but player amortisation further increased by £5m (3%) from £165m to £170m. There was also an increase in other expenses, which rose £7m (4%) from £190m to £197m.

Only two Premier League clubs have so far published accounts for 2024/25 (City and their neighbours, Manchester United), so comparisons with all the others are based on the latest available figures from the 2023/24 season.

However, it is evident that City’s £10m pre-tax loss is actually one of the better results in England’s top flight. United lost £40m last season, while four clubs posted losses above £50m in 2023/24, namely Aston Villa £86m, Bournemouth £66m, Liverpool £57m and Everton £53m.

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Norwich City’s awful start to the season with 10 defeats in 15 games has left them second bottom in the Championship, leading to the departure of head coach Liam Manning.

Ben Knapper said, “We have tried absolutely everything possible to work through this incredibly challenging period but, unfortunately, given the recent run of results and performances, we have been left with no choice other than to make a change at this stage.”

The sporting director added, “We very much understand the frustration and criticism from our supporters at this stage. So far, results and performances on the pitch haven’t been good enough.”

This opinion was echoed by majority owner Mark Attanasio in a recent Canary Call Q&A, “I have a lot of the same feelings as our supporters do, I get angry and scream at the television too.”

Changes

The departure of another head coach felt all too familiar after Johannes Hoff Thorup, the former manager of Nordsjaelland, parted company with the club a few months earlier in April. The Danish manager had lasted less than a season after replacing David Wagner.

In fact, when Norwich recruit Manning’s replacement, they will have employed six head coaches in just four years, which is far removed from the club’s traditional image of stability.

Knapper himself was only hired in November 2023, replacing the long-serving Stuart Webber, as the club embraced a data-led recruitment model.

When Manning arrived, Knapper said, “He has a proven track record and experience of the level, and we firmly believe he is the best candidate to help us achieve our primary target of promotion to the Premier League.”

Fans will hope that the next choice works out somewhat better.

Ownership

It wasn’t meant to be this way, when majority control passed to Attanasio’s Norfolk Holdings group from Delia Smith and Michael Wynn Jones after 28 years.

Attanasio, the owner of American baseball team Milwaukee Brewers, first purchased a minority 22% stake from former director Michael Foulger in September 2022, before increasing his shareholder to 40.4% in April 2024.

In March 2025 Attanasio converted his loans into equity, giving him 85% of the football club. Smith and her husband have retained 10%, while the remaining 5% is owned by independent shareholders, including the supporters’ group, The Canaries Trust.

Clearly, Norwich City owe a huge debt of gratitude to the former owners, so it feels only right that they have been appointed as Honorary Life Presidents.

League Position

In fairness, Norwich came mighty close to returning to the Premier League in 2023/24, when they reached the play-offs, only to be defeated by Leeds United in the semi-finals.

Under the former owners, the club had been promoted to the top flight on no fewer than five occasions, but they had become the classic “yo-yo” club, most notably in the four seasons between 2018/19 and 2021/22, when they were twice finished top of the Championship, only to twice come last in the Premier League.

So there has been a clear decline in sporting results, but how has the club performed off the pitch?

The 2024/25 accounts are quite instructive in highlighting the challenges facing the club. These cover a season when Norwich finished 13th in the Championship, which was disappointing after narrowly missing out the previous year. As Knapper observed, “it was a campaign that ultimately didn’t go to plan.”

Matters were not helped by the absence of Premier League parachute payments, marking the first year since 2018/19 that the club did not receive either full Premier League or parachute payment TV money.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Norwich City’s pre-tax loss widened from £14.4m to £20.7m, mainly due to a steep reduction in revenue, which dropped £33.8m (46%) from £73.1m to £39.3m.

This was only partly offset by a £15.0m (16%) cut in operating expenses from £94.2m to £79.2m, though the figures were helped by a £9.8m increase in profit on player sales from £13.4m to £23.2m.

Net interest payable decreased from £7.4m to £6.3m, due to lower debt funding, though was still on the high side for the Championship.

The main driver of Norwich’s revenue decrease was, of course, broadcasting, which fell £32.7m (73%) from £44.7m to £12.0m, after parachute payments ceased. However, the other revenue streams were also lower, as gate receipts declined £0.7m (7%) from £11.3m to £10.6m, while commercial was down £0.4m (3%) from £17.1m to £16.7m.

The lower revenue was partly compensated by a reduction in staff costs, but the wage bill was only cut £3.7m (7%) from £51.8m to £48.1m, though player amortisation was slashed by a third, falling £6.0m from £18.1m to £12.1m, and there was no repeat of the prior year’s £1.7m player impairment. Other expenses dropped £3.5m (18%) from £19.5m to £16.0m.

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