Roma’s 2024/25 accounts covered a season when they finished fifth in Serie A, their best result for five years, though they once again missed out on qualification for the Champions League.

They reached the last 16 of the Europa League, where they were defeated by Athletic Bilbao, and were eliminated by Milan in the quarter-finals of the Coppa Italia.

Many Changes Off the Pitch

This was Roma’s fifth season under the ownership of The Friedkin Group, who purchased the club from fellow American James Pallotta in August 2020.

In this period, there has been a fair degree of change at Roma, including no fewer than six head coaches.

Paulo Fonseca was the first to go, replaced by José Mourinho, who was sacked in January 2024, despite taking the club to two European finals.

The “special one” was succeeded by club legend Daniele De Rossi, but he was dismissed after a poor start to the current season. Things did not improve under Croatian Ivan Juric, whose stint in the hot seat lasted less than two months.

That ushered in the return of veteran manager Claudio Ranieri, who took charge of the giallorossi for the third time. The current incumbent is Gian Piero Gasperini, who joined Roma after nine successful years at Atalanta.

There has also been movement at a senior level off the pitch, as sporting director Tiago Pinto left by mutual consent in 2024, when he was replaced by Florent Ghisolfi, who had previously held the same role at French clubs Nice and Lens.

However, he only lasted a year before making way for Ricky Massara, who had been sporting director at Milan and Rennes.

League Position

Despite all this upheaval, Roma have been fairly consistent in in the league, finishing between 5th and 7th in each of the last seven seasons. That’s not too bad, but it does represent a decline in performance, as Roma had finished between 2nd and 3rd in the preceding five seasons.

Importantly, this means that Roma have missed out on qualifying for the lucrative Champions League in recent years, which has placed a strain on their finances.

So let’s take a look at the impact of those near misses and how the Friedkins have attempted to balance the books.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Roma’s pre-tax loss significantly reduced by €27m from €76m to €49m, which is the third year in a row that the bottom line has improved, but still represents a sizeable deficit. The much lower losses were needed to comply with the FFP settlement agreement signed with UEFA.

Revenue fell €27m (10%) from €254m to €227m, though this was more than offset by a big reduction in operating expenses, which were cut €61m (17%) from €363m to €302m. Net interest payable increased from €11m to €13m.

Profit from player sales slightly improved from €24m to €27m, but other income from player management was down €8m from €21m to €13m.

The loss after tax also dropped from €81m to €54m.

All three of Roma’s main revenue streams were lower. Broadcasting dropped €14m (13%) from €104m to €90m, while match day fell €11m (20%) from €55m to €44m and commercial was down €6m (6%) from €93m to €87m.

On the other hand, player loans increased from €1.6m to €5.7m.

As a technical aside, this definition of Roma’s €227m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts of €270m, which also included the €30m gain on player sales and €13m other income from player management. This also decreased by 10% (€30m) from the prior year’s €300m.

Roma’s efforts to get control of their cost base were evident in the steep reduction in wages, which were slashed by €49m (24%) from €202m to €153m. In addition, other expanse were cut €20m (17%) from €117m to €97m.

However, player amortisation rose €8m (19%) from €38m to €46m, while depreciation was up €1m (15%) from €6m to €7m.

Despite the improvement, Roma’s €49m pre-tax loss was still towards the lower end of Serie A last season, as only four clubs had higher deficits, namely Como €105m, Parma €64m, Monza €54m and Juventus €50m.

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One of the big football stories in Italy has been the rise of Como as they returned to Serie A after a 21-year absence, finishing in a very creditable 10th place in their first season back in 2024/25. To date, this season has been even more promising, as they are currently in 6th place, very much involved in the race for European qualification.

The team has often dazzled under its young coach Cesc Fabregas, who was appointed head coach in July 2024. The former Arsenal and Barcelona midfielder had previously been part of a coaching partnership with Welshman Osian Roberts, while he completed the required UEFA badges, which worked well, as the dynamic duo led Como to promotion from Serie B.

Wealthy Owners

Clearly, much of Como’s success has been built on the substantial financial support from their owners, the Hartono brothers, who bought the club in 2019.

The Indonesian businessmen are by some distance the wealthiest owners in Italian football, worth around $50 bln according to some estimates, thanks to their investments in sectors such as cigarettes, e-commerce, electronics and real estate.

Management of the club has been entrusted to their countryman, Mirwan Suwarso, who has been appointed president, while Como also benefit from the expertise of a number of minority shareholders, including Fabregas and French legend Thierry Henry.

Transfers Sumer 2025

As an example of Como’s new financial might, they splashed out more than €100m last summer to strengthen their squad, including the signings of Jesus Rodriguez from Real Betis, Nicolas Khun from Celtic, Martin Baturina from Dinamo Zagreb and Jayen Addai from AZ Alkmaar, while Maximo Perrone’s loan from Manchester City was made permanent. In addition, they took Alvaro Morata from Milan on loan.

According to Transfermarkt, this was the fifth highest gross spend in Serie A, only surpassed by Milan €157m, Juventus €137m, Atalanta €126m and Napoli €115m.

In another sign of their ambition, Como actually had the highest net spend in Italy last summer, as their €94m was comfortably ahead of Juventus €53m and Inter €42m.

League Position

Just seven years ago Como were playing in Serie D, the fourth tier of Italian football, so their ascent through the pyramid has been striking. Following promotion in 2018/19, they spent two seasons in Serie C, which incidentally includes 60 teams (three groups of 20), before going up in 2020/21.

It took them a while to get going in Serie B, but promotion to the top flight three years later was still a notable achievement, backed by significant owner investment, allied with good use of data analytics to help recruitment,

Administration

Before the arrival of the Indonesians, Como had suffered many financial issues, even entering administration on a couple of occasions, first in 2004 after two consecutive relegations, then in the 2016/17 season when the club was put up for auction, eventually being bought by the wife of Ghanaian footballer Michael Essien, before getting into more difficulties.

As a result, Calcio Como SpA and Calcio Como Srl have both been liquidated, so the club now operates as Como 1907 Srl, referencing the year it was founded.

New Strategy

Things look very different today, as the new owners have embraced an exciting vision encompassing Lake Como and its attraction to millions of tourists and various celebrities.

Mirwan Suwarso explained the strategy, “It’s really important for us to find a way to transform football into a real business. Football is the catalyst, the gateway, but ultimately we need to create an ecosystem that can support football activity. So, we need to make everything sustainable. A football club in a city of 85,000 people has enormous difficulty becoming sustainable with football alone, but we’re very fortunate to be located in a place where the city itself is a brand: Lake Como is a global brand.”

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Atalanta’s 2024/25 financial results cover a season when the team from Bergamo finished in an impressive third place in Serie A, while they reached the quarter-finals of the Coppa Italia, where they were defeated by the eventual winners Bologna.

They also returned to the Champions League after a 3-year absence, reaching the knockout round before being eliminated by Club Brugge.

In addition, they lost to Real Madrid in the UEFA Super Cup, having qualified by winning the Europa League the previous season, after thrashing Bayer Leverkusen 3-0 in the final.

Their charismatic manager Gian Piero Gasperini was understandably proud after the victory in Dublin, “Winning with Atalanta is one of those footballing fairytales that rarely crop up. It gives scope for meritocracy: there is still scope for ideas and doesn’t have to come down to cold, hard money.”

League Position

This was a reference to Atalanta’s financial disadvantages compared to the elite clubs, but the fact is that this is a club that has consistently punched above its weight, especially since the arrival of “Gasp” in June 2016.

In the following nine years, Atalanta have come third on no fewer than four occasions, while seven times finishing in the top five. Their lowest position was eighth, so they have clearly prospered, while other clubs of a similar size have struggled.

Ownership

This is the third set of accounts since the arrival of a US-based consortium led by Stephen Pagliuca in February 2022. They acquired a 55% stake in La Dea Srl, the controlling company of Atalanta, which holds about 86% of the club’s share capital, while the Percassi family retained a 45% stake.

Under the new agreement, Pagliuca was named co-chairman, with Antonio Percassi staying on as chairman and Luca Percassi as chief executive. In other words, the club’s governance effectively reflects an equal partnership.

Pagliuca is the co-owner of the storied NBA club, the Boston Celtics, and also co-chairman of Bain Capital, one of the leading investment funds in the world.

After sealing the deal, the American said, “We believe that the Percassi family has built very solid foundations on which to work together to strengthen the brand globally, with the aim of encouraging further diversification and growth of revenues, allowing the club to become more and more competitive on the Italian and international scene.”

Managerial Change

Given how much the club has relied on Gasperini, there was much trepidation among Atalanta fans, when the great man resigned at the end of last season, moving to Roma the following week.

The somewhat surprising choice as his replacement was Ivan Juric, who had failed in his last two jobs at Southampton and Roma. Indeed, the Croatian coach only lasted three months before he was dismissed, following a run of six consecutive draws and two defeats in Serie A.

He was succeeded by the former Fiorentina manager Raffaele Palladino, though this has not yet proved to be a silver bullet, as the team is currently languishing in mid-table.

Nevertheless, few would bet against Atalanta, as the club’s business model has proved rock solid for many years. Let’s take a look at the most recent accounts from the 2024/25 season to better understand their strategy.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

To highlight their strong performance, Atalanta posted an incredible €58.6m pre-tax profit last season. That’s very impressive, but it is no flash in the pan, as they have now been profitable ten years in a row, which is unprecedented in Italian football.

This was almost three times as much as the previous year’s €21.3m profit, after revenue rose €42m (26%) from €161m to €203m, a new club record.

The bottom line was further boosted by player trading, as profit from player sales increased by €30m (42%) from €71m to €101m, another club high, and other income from player management rose €5.6m (48%) from €11.8m to €17.4m.

This was partly offset by cost growth, as operating expenses rose €38m (17%) from €224m to €262m. In addition, net interest swung from €1.2m receivable to €0.5m payable.

Profit after tax was much lower at €37.9m, due to a €20.7m tax charge, though still much better than the prior year’s €11.9m profit.

The main driver of Atalanta’s revenue improvement was the return to the Champions League, which led to increases in broadcasting, up €31.1m (29%) from €107.5m to €138.6m, and match day, up €3.5m (31%) from €11.6m to €15.1m.

In addition, commercial rose €4.5m (11%) from €41.0m to €45.5m, while player loans tripled from €0.9m to €3.3m.

As a technical aside, this international definition of Atalanta’s €203m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts, which excludes the €3m player loans to give €199m operating revenue.

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Milan’s 2024/25 financial results covered a season that has to be considered as disappointing on the pitch, as they only finished eighth in the league, which was their lowest position for ten years, while they were defeated by Bologna in the Coppa Italia final.

On the plus side, they won the Supercoppa Italiana with a memorable comeback win against local rivals Inter, but they were eliminated in the Champions League knockout round by Feyenoord.

As a result of the club’s inconsistent form, head coach Paulo Fonseca was dismissed in December, when he was replaced by Sergio Conceicao, though he was in turn succeeded by the returning Max Allegri in May. In addition, Milan appointed the former Lazio player Igli Tare as sporting director.

Ownership

This was the third set of accounts reported under the ownership of Gerry Cardinale’s RedBird Capital Partners, who purchased the club from Elliott Management in August 2022 in a €1.2bln deal, with Elliot reportedly providing a €560m loan to help RedBird complete the acquisition.

The American investment company already had some experience in the world of football via their controlling interest in French club Toulouse and an 11% stake in Fenway Sports Group, Liverpool’s owners.

League Position

Before last season’s collapse, Milan had done pretty well on the pitch recently, finishing no lower than fourth place for four consecutive seasons, including a league title in 2021/22.

However, their eighth place meant that the Rossoneri missed out on European qualification, which was not the way they wanted to celebrate their 125th anniversary.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

However, the picture looked a lot better off the pitch, as Milan posted a pre-tax profit for the third year in a row, though this reduced slightly from €12m to €10m. This was especially impressive, given the indifferent sporting results.

Revenue rose €36m (9%) from (restated) €402m to €438m, which was a new club record, while profit on player sales increased by €10m (24%) from €44m to €55m.

This was offset by significant growth in operating expenses, which increased by €47m (11%) from €419m to €466m, while net interest payable surged from €1m to €6m.

Profit after tax was also down, falling from €4m to €3m, due to a €7m tax charge.

Milan’s revenue growth was driven by commercial, which rose €14m (8%) from €173m to €187m, and income from player loans and other player management, which more than tripled from €8m to €27m.

There was little change in the other revenue streams, as broadcasting increased by €2m (1%) from €152m to €154m, while match day was flat at €70m.

As a technical aside, this international definition of Milan’s €438m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts, which also includes the €56m gain on player sales and €1m change in inventory.

That gives a total revenue of €495m, which was €45m (10%) higher than the prior year’s €450m, so was another all-time club high.

Investment in the squad led to increases in both wages, up €6m (3%) from €183m to €189m, and player amortisation, up €9m (12%) from €75m to €84m. In addition, player write-downs tripled from €3m to €9m.

However, the biggest increase was in other expenses, which shot up €25m (18%) from €143m to €168m. On the other hand, exceptional charges fell €3m from €14m to €11m.

Although Milan did well to once again post positive numbers, their €10m pre-tax profit is only the fifth highest of the Serie A 2024/25 results to date, behind Atalanta €59m, Inter €50m, Bologna €20m and Torino €17m.

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Inter’s 2024/25 accounts cover a season that was very much a case of “close, but no cigar”, as they finished as runners-up in Serie A, just one point behind Napoli, while they reached the Champions League final before losing to Paris Saint-Germain.

They also lost to their great rivals Milan in the semi-finals of the Coppa Italia and the final of the Supercoppa Italiana. In addition, they participated in the shiny new FIFA Club World Cup, where they made the last 16 before losing to Brazilian club Fluminense.

President Beppe Moratta said that last season’s achievements “demonstrated the strength of our sporting project”, but the club “could not hide its disappointment at not having lifted a trophy”.

At the end of the season head coach Simone Inzaghi left by mutual consent, joining Saudi Arabian club Al-Hilal, being replaced by former Inter player, Cristian Chivu. The Romanian international had briefly been in charge at Parma, but probably more importantly had also spent many years leading Inter’s youth academy.

Ownership

This was Inter’s first full season under the control of Oaktree Capital Management, who became the new majority shareholder in May 2024, after the previous owners, the Chinese conglomerate Suning Group, had failed to repay a loan from Oaktree by the agreed deadline.

In May 2021 Oaktree had provided what it described as “rescue capital” to stabilise Inter’s financial situation, enabling the club to pay its players and staff, as it was confronted by huge losses, exacerbated the onset of the COVID pandemic.

However, this lifeline came at a price in the form of a €275m 3-year loan at 12% interest, which had grown to a hefty €395m at maturity. In the event of default, Oaktree would get their hands on the club.

Suning had acquired their majority share (68.6%) in June 2021 for around €270m at a time of much Chinese investment into European football clubs, but since then the Chinese government has imposed restrictions on overseas spending, leading to problems for a few club owners.

In Inter’s case, this resulted in the exit of Suning and arrival of Oaktree, which was not a great look for the Nerazzurri, but has seemingly worked out to be a decent solution.

Indeed, Marotta specifically thanked Oaktree for “supporting and guiding the club with professionalism and strategic vision along a path of global development”.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Even if they narrowly missed out in terms of silverware, Inter hit the bullseye off the pitch, as they swung from a €27m pre-tax loss to a €50m profit, a hefty year-on-year improvement of €77m.

As Marotta said, this represented “a historic milestone: for the first time in the club’s modern history, we recorded a net profit”.

This was driven by revenue, which shot up €144m (35%) from €407m to a huge new club record €551m, though profit from player sales fell from €65m to €14m. Growth in operating expenses was restricted to 4% (€18m), as these rose from €462m to €480m.

Net interest payable was unchanged at €35m, though this was still a huge burden. Indeed, Inter made an incredible €85m profit before interest.

After charging €15m tax, Inter’s profit after tax was €35m, compared to the previous season’s €36m loss.

The club said that the “positive impact of sporting results” was behind the significant revenue growth, as Inter reached the Champions League final and participated in the revamped FIFA Club World Cup.

As a result, all three main revenue streams set new club records, led by broadcasting, which surged €88m (50%) from €176m to €264m. Match day rose €29m (39%) from €75m to €104m, while commercial increased €28m (19%) from €147m to €175m.

Player loans and other income from player management slightly decreased from €8m to €7m.

As a technical aside, this international definition of Inter’s €551m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts, which also includes the €14m gain on player sales plus €2m capitalisation of youth programmes.

That gives a total revenue of €567m, which was €94m (20%) higher than the prior year’s €473m, mainly due to the sharp increase in recurring revenue.

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Juventus’ 2024/25 accounts cover a season when they finished fourth in Serie A, thus qualifying for the Champions League, but only thanks to an away win against Venezia on the last day of the season, while they were eliminated by Empoli in the Coppa Italia quarter-finals.

They reached the knockout round in the Champions League, where they were defeated by PSV Eindhoven, having come 20th in the new league stage.

The club was also one of Italy’s two representatives in the expanded FIFA Club World Cup in America, where they were beaten by Real Madrid in the last 16.

League Position

Coming fourth was not too bad, but Juventus have struggled by their own lofty standards in the last five years, given that they had won the league no fewer than nine seasons in a row before that.

Even so, there was yet another change in head coach as Thiago Motta was “relieved of his position” towards the end of the season, replaced by former Juve player Igor Tudor.

Off The Pitch

There have also been some important changes off the pitch, as Damien Comolli was appointed General Manager, reporting to Chief Executive Officer, Maurizio Scanavino.

The French executive has plenty of experience in the football world, most recently as president of Toulouse, while also holding the role of sporting director at Fenerbahce, Liverpool, Saint-Etienne and Tottenham Hotspur.

In addition, Giorgio Chiellini returned to Juventus, not as an uncompromising centre-half this time, but as Director of Football Strategy, reporting to Comolli.

Profit/(Loss) 2024/25

Juventus’ pre-tax loss significantly reduced from €196m to €50m, as revenue rose €68m (18%) from €372m to €440m and profit from player sales almost quadrupled from €23m to €90m.

In addition, operating expenses fell €11m (2%) from €570m to €559m, while net interest payable was slightly lower at €20m.

The loss after tax improved from €199m to €58m.

The main driver for the revenue growth was a return to the Champions League and participation in the FIFA Club World Cup, which led to a big increase in broadcasting, up €77m (78%) from €100m to €177m. Ticket sales also benefited from playing in Europe, rising €7m (13%) from €58m to €65m.

In addition, player loans were up €9m (76%) from €11m to €20m.

On the other hand, commercial dropped €26m (13%) from €203m to €177m, mainly due to the lack of a shirt sponsor.

As a technical aside, this international definition of Juventus’ €440m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts, which also includes a €90m gain on player sales, giving revenue of €530m. This was €135m (34%) higher than the prior year’s €395m.

Juventus said that they “continued to benefit from the positive effects arising from the structural cost rationalisation measures implemented over previous years”.

As a result, their wage bill dropped €19m (7%) from €264m to €245m, while player amortisation (including write-downs) fell €14m (10%) from €139m to €125m. However, this was largely offset by a sharp increase in other expenses, which rose €25m (19%) from €136m to €161m.

Although the substantial reduction in the pre-tax loss is obviously good news, the fact is that Juventus still lost €50m before tax, which is hardly small change.

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The recent sale of Khvicha Kvaratskhelia to Paris Saint-Germain for €70m once again highlighted Napoli’s ability to make big money from transfers. In the case of the exciting Georgian winger, this was exacerbated by the fact that his value in the books was only €2m, so the profit from the deal weighed in at a hefty €68m.

In fact, based on the reported fee, this was the fifth highest profit from a player sale ever made by an Italian club. This is nothing new for Napoli, who have no fewer than four of the top ten player trading profits, including the best of all with €86m from the sale of Gonzalo Higuain to Juventus in the 2016/17 season.

Despite Napoli frequently selling their big stars, the team has done pretty well in recent years, actually winning the league in 2022/23 for only the third time in their history, while playing some brilliant football under head coach Luciano Spalletti.

Given Napoli’s financial disadvantages compared to the traditional “big” Italian clubs, their consistently high finishes in Serie A have been pretty impressive, but the wheels came off last season, when they fell to 10th place, which was their lowest league position since 2008/09.

This was one of the worst ever title defences in Italy and meant that the club missed out on European qualification for the first time since 2009.

Napoli also crashed out of the Coppa Italia in the last 16, when they were thumped 4-0 at home by lowly Frosinone. More impressively, they got to the same stage of the Champions League, before being eliminated by Barcelona.

The Season of the Managers

This was not helped by numerous changes in the head coach, as the club had three different ones guiding the team during the 2023/24 season.

After Spalletti requested a year-long sabbatical (before being appointed manager of the Italy national team), former Roma manager Rudi Garcia was given first crack of the whip, though he was quickly sacked in November 2023 after an indifferent start to the season.

As a result, he was succeeded by Walter Mazzarri, but the veteran coach only lasted three months, before he was also dismissed. He was in turn succeeded by Francesco Calzona, one of Spalletti’s former assistants, who was given the job until the end of the season, though he continued to manage the Slovakian national team at the same time.

No matter, this season has seen the arrival of Antonio Conte, who has guided the team back to the top of the table, though there is obviously a long way to go before the club can declare victory.

Although Napoli struggled on the pitch last season, they again performed very well financially, which is very much a hallmark of owner Aurelio De Laurentiis, who bought the club in 2004 after it went bankrupt and was relegated to the third tier.

Since those dark days, the Italian film producer has preached financial sustainability, as can be seen by a review of the 2023/24 accounts.

Profit/(Loss) 2023/24

Napoli’s pre-tax profit fell from €118m to €91m, though this was still a hugely impressive figure by anyone’s standards. The club said that the decrease was due to “sporting results that were largely lower than expected”, which led to revenue dropping by €23m (8%) from their record €280m to €257m. In addition, profit from player sales was down from €80m to €71m.

Napoli’s operating expenses hardly increased at all, as they restricted growth to just 1% (€2m), which is unusual for football clubs these days. Net interest receivable shot up from €1m to €7m, due to the club’s very high cash balance.

The largest revenue decrease was broadcasting, which fell €19m (12%) from €161m to €142m. while match day was also down €11m (28%) from €38m to €27m and player loans more than halved from €4.6m to €2.2m.

On the other hand, commercial rose €10m (12%) from €76m to €86m.

As a technical aside, this international definition of Napoli’s €257m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts, which also includes the €71m gain on player sales, giving total revenue of €328m. This also fell €31m (9%) from the previous season’s €359m.

Despite the worse performances in Serie A and the Champions League, Napoli’s wage bill increased by €5m (5%) from €111m to €116m, though player amortisation fell €7m (10%) from €78m to €71m, while depreciation was also down by a third to €5m. However, other expenses were up again, rising €7m (15%) from €46m to €53m.

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Roma’s 2023/24 accounts covered a season when they finished sixth in Serie A for the third year in a row, which meant that they once again failed to qualify for the money-spinning Champions League.

On the plus side, they reached the semi-finals of the Europa League, where they were defeated by Bayer Leverkusen, though they were beaten by local rivals Lazio in the quarter-finals of the Coppa Italia.

Changes

This was Roma’s fourth season under the ownership of The Friedkin Group, who purchased the club from fellow American James Pallotta in August 2020.

In this period, there has been a fair degree of change at Roma, including five head coaches. In May 2021 Paulo Fonseca was replaced by José Mourinho, who was dismissed in January 2024, despite taking the club to two European finals.

The “special one” was succeeded by club legend Daniele De Rossi, but he was also fired after a poor start to the current season. However, things did not improve under Croatian Ivan Juric, so his stint in the hot seat lasted less than two months.

That ushered in the return of veteran manager Claudio Ranieri, who took charge of the Giallorossi for the third time.

There has also been movement at a senior level off the pitch, as sporting director Tiago Pinto left by mutual consent in September, replaced by Florent Ghisolfi, who had previously held the same role at French clubs Nice and Lens.

In addition, chief executive Lina Souloukou resigned the same month, following much unrest after the sacking of fan favourite De Rossi. She has been replaced on an interim basis by Ryan Friedkin, son of club president Dan Friedkin.

League Position

Despite all the upheaval, Roma have been the model of consistency in the league, finishing in 6th place in four of the last six seasons (the other two were 5th and 7th). That’s not too bad at all, but it does actually represent a decline in performance, as Roma had finished between 2nd and 3rd in the preceding five seasons.

Importantly, this means that Roma have missed out on qualifying for the lucrative Champions League in recent years, which has placed a strain on their finances. As De Rossi said before he exited stage left, “We are a team that needs to battle for the Champions League. That’s our objective. We’re starting to get a bit tired of always coming sixth.”

So let’s take a look at the impact of these near misses on Roma’s finances.

Profit/(Loss) 2023/24

Roma’s pre-tax loss reduced by €23m from €99m to €76m, which is the second year in a row that the bottom line has improved, but this still shows a sizeable deficit. The much lower losses were needed to comply with the FFP settlement agreement signed with UEFA.

Revenue rose €30m (13%) from €224m to €254m, a new club record, though this was partially offset by costs also increasing by €15m (4%) from €348m to €363m. There was a significant reduction in net interest payable, which decreased by €17m (60%) from €28m to €11m.

Profit from player sales almost halved from €47m to €24m, but other income from player management was up €15m from €6m to €21m.

The loss after tax also dropped from €103m to €81m.

Roma’s revenue increase was driven by commercial, which shot up €31m (49%) from €62m to €93m, while match day rose €6m (13%) from €49m to €55m. However, broadcasting fell €5m (5%) from €109m to €104m and player loans more than halved from €3.4m to €1.6m.

As a technical aside, this definition of Roma’s €254m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts of €302m, which also included the €25m gain on player sales, €21m other income from player management and €2m change in inventory. This increased by €25m (9%) from the prior year’s €277m.

Roma’s wage bill increased by €29m (17%) from €173m to €202m, but player amortisation fell €18m (32%) from €56m to €38m. Depreciation rose €1m (17%) from €5m to €6m, while other expenses were up €2m (2%) from €115m to €117m.

Despite the improvement, Roma’s €76m pre-tax loss was still the second worst result in Serie A last season, only surpassed by Juventus’ huge €196m deficit. In stark contrast, a few clubs generated chunky profits, especially Napoli €91m, Lazio €41m, Atalanta €21m and Milan €12m.

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Milan’s 2023/24 financial results cover a season when they finished second in Serie A and were eliminated in the quarter-finals of the Coppa Italia. They only finished third in their Champions League group, but then dropped down to the Europa League, where they got to the quarter-finals.

Ownership

This was the second set of accounts reported under the ownership of US investment company RedBird Capital Partners, who purchased the club from Elliott Management in August 2022 in a €1.2bln deal that included a minority stake for Major League Baseball club, the New York Yankees.

RedBird already had some experience in the world of football via their controlling interest in French club Toulouse and an 11% stake in Fenway Sports Group, Liverpool’s owners.

Before and after the change in ownership, Milan have done pretty well on the pitch finishing in the top four in each of the last four seasons, including a league title in 2021/22.

Profit/(Loss) 2023/24

Milan posted a pre-tax profit for the second year in a row, though this fell slightly from €14m to €12m. Despite a poorer performance in the Champions League, revenue rose €9m (2%) from €400m to a new club record €409m.

There was significant growth in operating expenses, which increased by €54m (14%) from €386m to €440m, but this was largely offset by higher profit from player sales, up to €44m from just €226k.

Profit after tax dropped from €6m to €4m, due to an €8m tax charge.

Milan’s revenue growth was driven by commercial, which rose €33m (23%) from €146m to €179m, while income from player loans was up 21% to €8m.

However, there were decreases in the other revenue streams, due to less progress in the Champions League. Broadcasting fell €23m (13%) from €175m to €152m, while match day was down €4m (5%) from €73m to €69m.

As a technical aside, this international definition of Milan’s €409m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts, which also includes a €45m gain on player sales and €3m change in inventory.

That gives total revenue of €457m, which was €52m (13%) higher than the prior year’s €405m, mostly due to the sharp increase in player sales. Even on this basis, this was another all-time high for the club.

As a result of Milan’s investment in the squad, wages increased by €15m (8%) from €174m to €189m and player amortisation rose €24m (48%) from €51m to €75m. Other expenses also climbed €10m (7%) from €134m to €144m, while exceptional charges more than doubled from €6m to €14m.

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Inter’s 2023/24 accounts cover a season when they won Serie A, the second time that they had secured the league title in four years, and beat Napoli to win the Supercoppa Italiana, though they were beaten by Bologna in the last 16 of the Coppa Italia.

They also reached the last 16 of the Champions League before being eliminated by Atletico Madrid, which was a decent performance, but could not match the previous season, when the Nerazzurri got as far as the final, where they were narrowly defeated by Manchester City.

Ownership

Despite the success on the pitch, Inter’s ownership changed hands in May 2024, when Oaktree Capital Management became the new majority shareholder, increasing the number of American owners in Italy.

This was because the previous owners, the Chinese conglomerate Suning Group, had failed to repay a loan from Oaktree by the agreed deadline. Suning president, Steven Zhang, had been attempting to negotiate a loan with US fund Pimco in order to pay off the debt, but the talks came to nothing.

In May 2021 Oaktree had provided what it described as “rescue capital” to stabilise Inter’s financial situation, as it was confronted by huge losses, exacerbated the onset of the COVID pandemic.

This enabled the club to pay its players and staff, but this lifeline came at a price in the form of a €275m 3-year loan at 12% interest, which had grown to a hefty €395m at maturity. In the event of default, Oaktree would get their hands on the club, which is exactly what happened.

Suning had acquired their majority share (68.6%) in June 2021 for around €270m at a time of much Chinese investment into European football clubs. However, the Chinese government subsequently imposed restrictions on overseas spending, leading to problems for the club owners.

In Inter’s case, this has resulted in the exit of Suning and arrival of Oaktree, so what sort of financial situation has been inherited by the new owners?

Profit/(Loss) 2023/24

There was a significant improvement in Inter’s bottom line last season, as the pre-tax loss reduced by around €50m from €77m to €27m (€36m after tax).

The improvement was largely driven by higher profit from player sales, which more than doubled from €28m to €65m. Revenue also rose €11m (3%) from €396m to €407m, a new club record, while operating expenses were €2m lower at €462m.

Net interest payable also fell €2m (5%) from €37m to €35m, though this is still a huge interest burden, taking the club into a loss-making position. Indeed, it’s worth underlining the fact that Inter were actually profitable before charging interest.

The club said that the “positive sporting results” had contributed to the revenue growth, particularly in commercial, which rose €40m (38%) from €107m to €147m.

However, less progress in the Champions League led to falls in both broadcasting, down €20m (10%) from €196m to €176m, and match day, down €7m (9%) from €82m to €75m. Player loans and other income from player management also decreased from €11m to €8m.

As a technical aside, this international definition of Inter’s €407m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts, which also includes the €66m gain on player sales plus €1m capitalisation of youth programmes.

That gives a total revenue of €473m, which was €48m (11%) higher than the prior year’s €425m, due to the sharp increase in player sales. Looking at revenue on this basis, this was another all-time high for the club.

Inter’s wage bill was virtually unchanged at €227m, though player amortisation dropped by €15m (16%) from €90m to €75m, while player write-downs were slightly down from €8m to €7m.

On the other hand, other expenses grew €8m (7%) from €115m to €123m, while depreciation increased by €5m (25%) from €25m to €30m.

Despite the big improvement, the harsh reality is that Inter still posted a €27m pre-tax loss in 2023/24, though this was much better than Juventus’ enormous €196m deficit. In contrast, Milan made a €12m profit, while Lazio did even better last season with a €41m surplus.

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Juventus’ 2023/24 accounts cover a season when they finished third in Serie A and won the Coppa Italia after defeating Atalanta in the final.

However, they did not play in Europe for the first time since 2011/12, which really hurt the club’s finances.

This was because UEFA punished Juventus for breaches of the August 2022 FFP settlement agreement by excluding them from Europe, while also fining them €20m (though €10m was conditional, depending on whether they met future financial targets).

Juve waived their right of appeal, which made sense from a financial perspective, as they only lost money from the Europa Conference League, as opposed to potentially missing out on the far more lucrative Champions League.

As a result of their various legal issues, Juventus had been given a 10-points penalty by the Italian authorities, which was enough to drop them from third to seventh in Serie A in 2022/23, meaning that they only qualified for the Conference League (before the ban).

League Position

In truth, Juventus were already struggling on the pitch (by their own high standards). Having won the league nine seasons in a row, they dropped down to fourth place in both 2020/21 and 2021/22.

The partial recovery to third place last season was important, as it meant that Juventus are back in the Champions League this season.

Eve so, Massimiliano Allegri was “relieved of his position” towards the end of last season, replaced by Thiago Motta after his fine achievements at Bologna.

Profit/(Loss) 2023/24

Juventus’ pre-tax loss significantly increased from €117m to €196m (€199m after tax), which the club said was “heavily influenced by the non-participation in UEFA competitions”, as well as €36m of non-recurring costs.

Revenue fell €89m (19%) from €461m to €372m, while profit on player sales more than halved from €47m to €22m.

This was partly offset by a reduction in operating expenses, which were cut by €37m (6%), though net interest payable increased by €3m (14%) to €21m.

The main driver for the steep revenue decrease was broadcasting, which dropped €57m (37%) from €157m to €100m. entirely due to the lack of European TV money.

The other revenue streams were also impacted by not playing in Europe, as ticket sales fell €4m (6%) from €62m to €58m, while commercial decreased €16m (7%) from €219m to €203m.

In addition, player loans were down more than 50% from €23m to €11m.

As a technical aside, this international definition of Juventus’ €372m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts, which also includes a €23m gain on player sales, giving total revenue of €395m. This was €113m (22%) lower than the prior year’s €508m.

Juventus said that they had benefited from “the decisive actions taken in recent years to structurally rationalise costs”.

As a result, their wage bill dropped €18m (6%) from €282m to €264m, while player amortisation (including write-downs) fell €20m (13%) from €159m to €139m. In addition, other expenses decreased €9m (6%) from €145m to €136m.

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It’s fair to say that before the 2023/24 season kicked off, few football fans would have expected Bologna to qualify for the Champions League, after many years of mid-table obscurity in Serie A.

However, the Rossoblù significantly outperformed expectations to achieve this difficult objective by finishing in an impressive fifth place (after the performance of Italian teams in Europe secured an additional Champions League spot for Serie A).

Under head coach Thiago Motta, Bologna proved to be one of last season’s biggest surprise packages, playing fluid, progressive football to finish higher than some of Italy’s traditional giants.

Of course, the danger when a smaller club does well is that the bigger clubs will tempt the talent away, which has already happened here, as Motta did not renew his contract after the season ended. The smart money is on the former Italy international moving to Juventus after the sacking of Max Allegri.

History

To underline the magnitude of Bologna’s feat, this is the first time that they have managed to qualify for Europe’s leading competition in 60 years.

It is true that they have been Serie A winners on no fewer than seven occasions, but most of these victories came before the Second World War, while their most recent title was in 1964.

Ownership

After numerous changes in ownership and issues with financial mismanagement, culminating in relegation to Serie B, Canadian businessman Joey Saputo invested in Bologna in October 2014 as part of consortium also involving Joe Tacopina.

Saputo, who has been president of MLS team CF Montréal for many years, has said that his initial idea was to only assume a marginal role, but Bologna’s financial difficulties led him to become majority shareholder and chairman.

Under his ownership, the club was immediately promoted back to the Italian top flight in 2015, where it has remained ever since, which is not too bad, given Bologna’s limited budget.

Supporters have not always been enamoured of Saputo, once putting banners around the training ground, asking “where are you?”, but the Canadian’s bold prediction back in 2015 that “in ten years we will reach Europe” has now come to pass.

So let’s take a look at the finances of the club from Emilia-Romagna to see how this improvement has been accomplished, using the most recent accounts from the 2022/23 season, when Bologna finished in a creditable ninth place.

Profit/(Loss) 2022/23

Bologna reduced their pre-tax loss in 2022/23 by over two-thirds, as this fell from €46m to €14m. This was mainly thanks to significant increases in revenue, up €13m (21%) from €63m to €76m, and profit from player sales, which more than doubled from €14m to €34m. Other income from player management was also up €4.3m from €2.6m to €6.9m.

The growth was partly offset by higher operating expenses, which rose €6m (5%) from €124m to €130m.

The loss after tax decreased from €47m to €16m after a €2m tax charge.

There was growth in all of Bologna’s revenue streams, though commercial led the way, rising €6m (40%) from €16m to €22m. Broadcasting increased €5m (12%) from €42m to €47m, while match day was up €1.9m (43%) from €4.5m to €6.4m. However, player loans slightly fell from €0.5m to €0.3m.

Bologna’s wage bill slightly rose from €68m to €69m, but player amortisation fell €4m (12%) from €34m to €30m, though player write-downs were up from €0.5m to €4.0m. Other expenses increased by a third, rising €6m from €20m to €26m.

As a technical aside, the definition of revenue used in Bologna’s accounts off €117m is different to the one used in my analysis of €76m, as this also includes the €35m gain on player sales and €6m other income from player management.

Despite the improvement, Bologna’s €14m pre-tax loss was only the twelfth best result in Serie A in 2022/23, as some clubs did very well financially, especially Napoli, who posted the highest ever profit in Italy with an amazing €118m. Five other clubs also managed to make money, though the next highest were much smaller, namely Milan €14m and Cremonese €10m.

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This is turning out to be a fantastic season for Atalanta, who defeated Bayer Leverkusen 3-0 to win the Europa League, thanks to a glorious hat-trick by Ademola Lookman, to win their first trophy since 1963.

They could hardly be accused of enjoying an easy ride to this achievement, having overcome Sporting, Liverpool and Marseille on their way to the final, before inflicting the first defeat of the season on Leverkusen’s “invincibles”.

In addition, Atalanta reached the final of the Coppa Italia, though they were beaten by Juventus, and have also qualified for the Champions League. They will finish no lower than fourth in Serie A and could end up as high as third, depending on the results in the last round of matches.

This is no flash in the pan, as Atalanta have been punching well above their weight for a while now. As chairman Antonio Percassi said, “over the last ten years the club has delivered exceptional results, that perhaps no one would have expected from a so called provinciale.”

Their charismatic manager Gian Piero Gasperini was understandably proud after the victory in Dublin, “Winning with Atalanta is one of those footballing fairytales that rarely crop up. It gives scope for meritocracy: there is still scope for ideas and doesn’t have to come down to cold, hard money.”

This was a reference to Atalanta’s financial disadvantages compared to the elite clubs, which raises the question of exactly how has La Dea managed to prosper, while others have fallen by the wayside?

Let’s take a look at Atalanta’s most recent accounts from the 2022/23 season to better understand the club’s business model.

Profit/(Loss) 2022/23

Atalanta posted a €9.4m pre-tax profit in 2022/23, which was the eighth year in a row that they had been profitable.

Their revenue was only €119m, while expenses were €186m, leading to a hefty €67m operating loss. However, this was wiped out by €76m from player trading, split between €63m profit from player sales and €13m other income from player management.

Profit after tax was smaller at €5.6m after a €3.8m tax charge.

Even without the benefit of any income from UEFA competitions, Atalanta still managed to post a profit, which was pretty impressive.

Year-on-Year Comparison

As the previous accounts only covered six months, Atalanta also provided a comparison against a pro forma 12-month period, which showed that pre-tax profit sightly fell from €12.0m to €9.4m.

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The announcement that Roma had sacked José Mourinho might have come as a surprise to some, given that the experienced Portuguese manager had led the club to two European finals and still retained the support of much of the fan base, but the decision was understandable from a financial perspective.

The fact that this was a business assessment becomes more evident once the club’s 2022/23 accounts are analysed.

These cover a season when Roma finished 6th in Serie A for the second year in a row, which meant that they once again failed to qualify for the money-spinning Champions League. However, they did reach the final of the Europa League, where they were defeated by Sevilla on penalties.

This was Roma’s third season under the ownership of The Friedkin Group, who purchased the club from fellow American James Pallotta in August 2020.

Profit/(Loss) 2022/23

The good news is that Roma’s pre-tax loss more than halved, narrowing from €219m to €99m, which is a significant improvement, but this was still a sizeable deficit. The greatly reduced loss was needed to comply with the settlement agreement signed with UEFA.

Revenue rose €28m (14%) from €196m to €224m, while profit from player sales shot up from €5m to €47m, while costs were cut by €52m (13%) to €349m, though net interest payable increased by €5m (21%) from €23m to €28m.

Loss after tax also fell from €219m to €103m.

Roma’s revenue increase was driven by match day, which nearly doubled from €26m to €49m, while broadcasting rose €16m (18%) from €93m to €109m. Commercial fell €11m (15%) from €73m to €62m, though this was mainly due to high player insurance payouts in the previous year. Player loans also decreased from €5m to €3m.

As a technical aside, this definition of Roma’s €224m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts of €277m, which also included the €47m gain on player sales and €6m income from other player management. This rose by a third (€71m) from the prior year’s €206m.

Roma’s cost base was reduced across the board, especially staff costs, as the wage bill was cut €10m (5%) from €183m to €173m and player amortisation decreased €22m (28%) from €78m to €56m.

In addition, depreciation fell €13m (72%) from €18m to €5m, while other expenses were down €8m (6%) from €123m to €115m.

Despite the improvement, Roma’s €99m pre-tax loss was the second highest in Serie A last season, only surpassed by Juventus €117m., though it was better than Inter €77m. In stark contrast, Napoli reported a €118m profit, which was an Italian record, while Milan also notched up a €14m surplus.

It was much the same story for the net figures after tax, though Roma’s loss was a bit higher at €103m. Losses were also more than before tax at Juventus €124m and Inter €85m.

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Milan’s 2022/23 financial results cover a season when they finished fourth in Serie A and were eliminated in the last 16 of the Coppa Italia, but most impressively they got as far as the semi-finals of the Champions League, where they lost out to city rivals Inter.

Ownership

These were the first accounts reported under the ownership of US investment company RedBird Capital Partners, who purchased the club from Elliott Management in August 2022 in a €1.2bln deal that included a minority stake for Major League Baseball club, the New York Yankees.

RedBird already had some experience in the world of football via their controlling interest in French club Toulouse and an 11% stake in Fenway Sports Group, Liverpool’s owners.

Profit/(Loss) 2022/23

Milan’s success on the pitch helped them return to profit for the first time in 17 years, as they swung from a €60m pre-tax loss to a €14m profit, which chairman Paolo Scaroni described as an “important step”.

Scaroni added, “Combining sporting performance, global competitiveness and financial sustainability in football, when on a virtuous path, is possible.”

Revenue rose €126m (46%) from €274m to a club record €400m, slightly offset by profit from player sales falling from €3m to almost nothing.

Operating expenses increased by €36m (10%) to €386m, but net interest payable dropped €4m to only €1m. In addition, there was no repeat of the previous season’s €18m profit from the exceptional sale of Casa Milan.

Profit after tax was €6m, compared to prior year’s €67m loss.

All of Milan’s revenue streams experienced significant growth under the new ownership with each of them setting new club highs. Match day more than doubled from €33m to €73m; commercial rose 41% (€42m) from €104m to €146m; and broadcasting increased 31% (€42m) from €133m to €175m.

In addition, player loans income was up 29% to €6m.

As a technical aside, this international definition of Milan’s €400.4m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts, which also includes the €0.3m gain on player sales and a €3.8m change in inventory. That gives total revenue of €404.5m, which has increased by €106.9m (36%) over prior year €297.6m.

Milan’s costs also increased, but at nowhere near the same rate as revenue. Wages slightly increased by 2% (€4m) from €170m to €174m, while player amortisation fell €12m (5%) from €63m to €51m and player write-downs halved from €8m to €4m.

On the other hand, other expenses grew €38m (40%) from €96m to €134m and depreciation nearly tripled from €6m to €16m.

Milan’s €14m pre-tax profit was the second highest in Serie A last season, albeit it was over €100m lower than Napoli’s €118m, though in fairness that was an Italian record. Both these results were in stark contrast to the large losses posted by the likes of Juventus €117m, Roma €99m and Inter €77m.

It was much the same story for the net figures after tax, though Milan’s €6m profit was also behind Cremonese €7m, as the Grigiorossi benefited from a smaller tax charge. Losses were even larger than before tax at Juventus €124m, Roma €103m and Inter €85m.

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Not only did Napoli win the scudetto last season, but they achieved this in a lot of style, playing some brilliant football under head coach Luciano Spalletti to seal the deal with six rounds to spare. This was only the third title in their history, over 30 years after the Maradona inspired triumph in 1990.

Give Napoli’s financial disadvantages compared to the traditional “big” Italian clubs, this was a very impressive feat, especially as this came after they had sold (or released) some of the team’s bigger stars before the season started, replacing them with relative unknowns.

This was very much in line with the modus operandi established by owner, Aurelio De Laurentiis, who had bought the club in 2004 after Napoli went bankrupt and were relegated to the third tier. They soon bounced back with two promotions in three seasons, with the Italian film producer insisting that the club follows a sustainable strategy.

There was some disappointment in 2022/23, as they were eliminated in the Champions League quarter-finals by domestic rivals Milan, who finished a hefty 20 points behind Napoli in the league, which counted as a surprise.

After his herculean efforts, Spalletti requested a year-long sabbatical at the end of the season, though he has since been appointed manager of the Italy national team. He was replaced by former Roma manager Rudi Garcia, but the Frenchman was then dismissed in November after an indifferent start. As a result, he was succeeded by veteran coach Walter Mazzarri.

Returning to happy times, let’s take a look at the impact that winning the league has had on Napoli’s finances by reviewing the 2022/23 accounts.

Profit/(Loss) 2022/23

Napoli swung from a €66m pre-tax loss to an all-time Italian record profit of €118m, a massive improvement of €184m. Revenue rose €115m (69%) from €165m to a new club high of €280m, while profit from player sales shot up from just €4m to €80m.

However, Napoli’s operating expenses hardly increased at all, as they restricted growth to only 4% (€8m), which is unusual for clubs enjoying such a successful season.

After tax, Napoli went from a €52m loss to an €80m profit, net of a €38m tax charge.

Napoli’s largest revenue increase was broadcasting, which rose €71m (79%) from €90m to €161m, mainly thanks to participation in the Champions League. There was also significant growth in the other two revenue streams, as match day more than tripled from €12m to €38m, while commercial was up €24m (48%) from €52m to €76m. In contrast, player loans dropped €7m (61%) from €12m to €5m.

As a technical aside, this international definition of Napoli’s €280m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts, which also includes the €80m gain on player sales, giving total revenue of €359m. On this basis, total revenue has more than doubled from the previous season’s €176m.

Incredibly, given all the success on the pitch, Napoli’s wage bill actually reduced by €19m (15%) from €130m to €111m, though there were increases in the cost base elsewhere.

Player amortisation rose €7m (11%) from €71m to €78m, while depreciation more than doubled from €4m to €10m. Other expenses were up €14m (48%) from €29m to €43m.

Napoli’s €118m pre-tax profit was in a class of its own in last season’s Serie A, miles more than the next highest surplus, namely Milan €14m. This was in stark contrast to the large losses posted by the likes of Juventus €117m, Roma €123m and Inter €77m.

Not all clubs have published their accounts for the 2022/23 season, but a few of them did manage to generate small profits: Cremonese €10m, Atalanta €9m and Sassuolo €5m.

It was much the same story for net figures after tax, though Napoli’s profit was reduced to “only” €80m after a €38m tax charge, while the losses were even larger than before tax at Juventus €124m, Roma €103m and Inter €85m.

Napoli’s superlative financial results were boosted by €80m profit from player sales, up from prior year’s €4m. This was mainly driven by the sales of Kalidou Koulibaly to Chelsea (€42m gain), Fabian Ruiz to PSG €22m and Andrea Petagna to Monza €9m.

In addition, they offloaded a few players on free transfers, which obviously generated no profit, but did reduce the wage bill, including club stalwarts Lorenzo Insigne to Toronto FC and Dries Mertens to Galatasaray plus David Ospina to Al-Nassr.

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Inter’s 2022/23 accounts cover a season when they won the Coppa Italia and the Supercoppa Italiana, both for the second season running, and finished third in Serie A under head coach Simone Inzaghi.

However the highlight was the team’s amazingEuropean campaign, which culminated in the Nerazzurri reaching the Champions League, where they were narrowly defeated by Manchester City.

This was a great achievement, which was underlined by Steven Zhang, who proclaimed, “Inter are back at the top, starring on the most prestigious stage in the world.” The chairman was understandably proud, but what exactly did this mean for Inter’s finances?

Profit/(Loss) 2022/23

Inter’s pre-tax loss has significantly fallen from €137m to €77m, thanks to what the club described as “financial rebalancing”. This referred to a combination of increasing revenue, which rose €71m (22%) from €325m to €396m, and reducing costs, which were cut by €54m (10%).

The improvement was further boosted by net interest payable dropping by €11m (23%) from €48m to €37m, though it’s worth noting that this is still a huge annual interest burden, which has effectively doubled Inter’s loss from €40m to €77m.

So the club took many steps in the right direction, which were more than enough to offset the substantial €77m decrease in profit on player sales from €105m to €28m.

Loss after tax also reduced from €140m to €85m after booking an €8m tax charge.

Success on the pitch contributed to revenue growth in both match day, which more than doubled from €40m to a new Italian record of €82m, and broadcasting, up €41m (26%) from €156m to €197m. Player loans and other income from player management nearly tripled from €4m to €11m.

However, commercial fell €19m (15%) from €126m to €107m, mainly due to non-payment of the shirt sponsorship.

As a technical aside, this international definition of Inter’s €396m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts, which also includes the €29m gain on player sales plus €0.4m capitalisation of youth programmes.

That gives a total revenue of €426m, which is €14m (3%) lower than prior year’s €440m, mainly due to the sharp reduction in player sales.

Inter significantly reduced their staff costs with action taken in the transfer window of summer 2022 cutting the wage bill by €21m (9%) from €248m to €227m. In addition, player amortisation dropped by €11m (11%) from €101m to €90m, while player write-downs more than halved from €17m to €8m.

On the other hand, other expenses grew €13m (14%) from €102m to €115m, though depreciation slightly fell to €25m.

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Juventus have published their accounts for the 2022/23 season, which was disappointing for a number of reasons. We’ll get round to the finances later, but before that we need to address the veritable plethora of damaging off the pitch issues faced by the “Old Lady”.

Legal Issues

After the Italian Football Federation (FIGC) brought charges against Juventus for financial irregularities, the club’s board of directors resigned, including chairman Andrea Agnelli, vice-chairman Pavel Nedved and chief executive Maurizio Arrivabene.

The club has actually had to deal with two separate legal cases: the first one involved over-stated capital gains via inflated player trading values, while there was also another one with allegations of false accounting involving salary “manoeuvres”.

Transfer Deals

Juventus were accused of boosting profits from player sales (“plusvalenza”) with the FIGC raising concerns about no fewer than 42 transfers. This included swap deals, where both clubs apparently inflated the price to be used in the accounts, so they could each book higher gains.

Salary Manoeuvres

Following huge revenue losses caused by COVID, Juventus announced that their players had given up four months of wages, whereas in reality the club had committed to pay three of those months at a future date.

Accounts Restatement

This resulted in Juventus restating its accounts for two years, increasing the 2020/21 loss by €17m, but reducing the 2021/22 loss by €15m. Most damningly, the FIGC said, “The financial statements are simply not reliable.”

Points Deduction

As a result of these legal issues, Juventus suffered a 10-points penalty, which was enough to drop them from third to seventh in Serie A. Without this points deduction, they would have qualified for the Champions League.

In addition, the club accepted a fine of €718k as part of a plea bargain agreed with the FIGC. This at least drew a line under the scandal, which allowed Juve to move forward without the threat of further sporting sanctions hanging over them.

UEFA Punishment

UEFA also punished Juventus for breaches of the August 2022 settlement agreement by excluding them from Europe in 2023/24 and fining them €20m (though €10m was made conditional, depending on whether the club met future financial targets).

Juve waived their right of appeal, which made sense, as it means they only lose Europa Conference League money this season, as opposed to potentially missing out on the far more lucrative Champions League.

Recent Issues

To add to Juve’s woes, their former star player, Cristiano Ronaldo, has recently taken legal action against the club over €19.5m unpaid wages (linked to the salary manoeuvres case).

And to prove that it never rains, but it pours, Paul Pogba has failed a drugs test, so his Juve career is in the balance, though from a purely financial perspective this could give the club the opportunity to terminate the misfiring French midfielder’s contract with a big salary saving.

Profit/(Loss) 2022/23

Juventus’ 2022/23 accounts cover a season when they finished 7th in Serie A (following the points deduction) and reached the semi-finals of the Coppa Italia. In Europe, they were eliminated at the group stage of the Champions League, dropping down to the Europa League, where they got to the semi-finals.

Their pre-tax loss more than halved from €237m to €117m (€124m after tax), as revenue rose €46m (11%) from €414m to €460m, partly due there being no more COVID impact, while profit on player sales increased €19m (67%) from €28m to €47m.

In addition, operating expenses were cut by €58m (9%), though net interest payable increased €2m (14%) to €18m.

The club noted that the loss would have been further reduced by around €23m without the adverse impact on revenue and costs of the various legal issues, both Italian and international. It quantified the total reduction as €115m, split 20% in 2022/23 and 80% (€92m) in 2023/24.

The removal of all COVID restrictions in the stadium meant that Juventus’ ticket sales increased €29m (90%) from €32m to €61m, while commercial also rose €19m (10%) from €200m to a new club record of €219m. In addition, player loans almost doubled from €12m to €23m.

However, broadcasting fell €13m (8%) from €170m to €157m, mainly due to lower receipts from UEFA competitions.

As a technical aside, this international definition of Juventus’ €460m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts, which also includes €47m gain on player sales, giving revenue of €508m, which increased €64m (14%) from prior year’s €443m.

Juventus made a great effort to cut costs, as their wage bill dropped a sizeable €55m (16%) from €337m to €282m, while player amortisation (including write-downs) fell €14m (8%) from €173m to €159m. In addition, depreciation/other provisions decreased €3m, but other expenses grew €14m (11%) to €145m.

There are two ways of looking at Juventus’ 2022/23 financial results: on the one hand, there has been a substantial reduction in the deficit; on the other hand, the pre-tax loss was still huge at €117m and also one of the largest in Italy.

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Whisper it quietly, but it looks like the ownership saga at Sampdoria might just be coming to an end, as the shareholders have approved an agreement for the takeover of the club by Leeds United owner Andrea Radrizzani and his partner Matteo Manfredi through Gestio Capital and Aser Holding. It is also expected that QSI, the owners of Paris Saint-Germain, will take a minority stake.

The club had previously been involved in negotiations with Alessandro Barnaba and American investment firm Merlyn Partners, the owners of Lille, but their interest ultimately did not come to anything.

Financial Issues

However, it looks like the agreement came too late to make the payment of three month’s wages (around €13.5m) before the 30th May deadline, which was needed to avoid a four points penalty next season. After announcing the deal, club president Marco Lanna said, “Will we be able to avoid the penalty? I don’t know, we’ll think about it tomorrow.”

After a terrible season, Sampdoria were already relegated to Serie B, but the fans had been concerned that their club might be declared bankrupt, which would have resulted in further demotion to the bottom of the Italian football pyramid.

Fortunately, yesterday’s announcement means that Samp have avoided that fate, assuming that the deal will be ratified.

The club said that there would be a capital increase of €40m plus the issue of a bond loan, which would enable a restructuring plan.

The purchasers had previously emphasised that the required funding was already in place, adding, “Our commitment is to ensure the financial stability of the club and in particular to protect the interests of creditors with an eye to those of small size. This offer represents an important departure from the previous ownership and certifies a clear desire to preserve the coat of arms and tradition of a historic club such as Sampdoria.”

Current Owner

The club has been in turmoil ever since previous owner Massimo Ferrero was arrested in December 2021 for issues relating to his business affairs elsewhere, i.e. not involving Sampdoria, which meant that he stepped down as president, necessitating the appointment of a new board under the chairmanship of Lanna, a former player.

Film producer Ferrero had purchased Sampdoria from the Garrone family in June 2014 for around €15m including the club’s debt. He has angered fans by his refusal to sell to new owners that would be more likely to provide the investment needed to relaunch the Blucerchiati.

The late, great Gianluca Vialli was involved in a consortium with American fund York Capital Management that tried to rescue Sampdoria, but that offer was finally withdrawn after almost a year of discussions with Ferrero, who was accused of constantly moving the goalposts.

Finally, Ferrero has given the green light to the sale of Sampdoria, though Lanna cautioned, “We have established the capital increase. There are still many steps and technicalities to complete, but the big step has been taken.”

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After the recent announcement that Lina Souloukou has been appointed as AS Roma’s new chief executive, I thought that it might be interesting to take a look at the financial challenges facing the former CEO of Olympiacos, focusing on the club’s 2021/22 accounts.

These cover a season when Roma finished 6th in Serie A and reached the quarter-finals of the Coppa Italia, but most importantly won their first trophy for 14 years by defeating Feyenoord to win the inaugural Europa Conference League.

This victory was achieved under the guidance of Jose Mourinho, who had replaced Paolo Fonseca at the end of the previous season. It was also Roma’s second season under the ownership of The Friedkin Group, who purchased the club from fellow American James Pallotta in August 2020.

Profit/(Loss) 2021/22

Roma’s pre-tax loss increased by €35m from €184m to €219m, the highest in the club’s history. Revenue was basically flat at €196m, while operating expenses rose €37m (10%) to €391m, though net interest payable fell by a third (€12m) from €36m to €24m.

They actually made a net £4m loss from player sales, while other income from player management fell £5m to £3m.

The return of fans to the stadium meant a steep increase in Roma’s match day revenue, which increased to €26m from just €99k in the prior year. Commercial also rose by €20m (37%) from €53m to €73m, though this was mainly due to player insurance payouts.

However, broadcasting fell €44m (32%) from €137m to €93m, largely because prior year figures included money deferred from the extended 2019/20 season for games played after the June accounting close. Player loans also decreased €1m to €5m.

As a technical aside, this definition of Roma’s €196m revenue is different to the one used in the club accounts of €191m, as I have also included the £5m earned from player loans.

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